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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
This

action

is before

the court upon a Petition for

Writ of Certiorari from an order and judgment of the Utah Court
of Appeals entered February 2, 1990.
Certiorari was granted on May 21, 1990.

The Petition for Writ of
This court has appellate

jurisdiction over a judgment of the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a) (1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether

a judgment

docketed

against

a

land

contract

seller after he sells land on an installment contract is a lien
on that
therein.

land, creating an encumbrance on the buyer's

interest

Because this case was decided in the district court on

stipulated facts, this court may review the decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals for correctness and examine the facts de novo.
Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great Northern Baseball Co.,
748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
From

the time the judgment of the district court or

circuit court is docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of
the district court of the county it becomes a lien upon all real
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in
the county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him at the
time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said

lien.

A transcript of judgment rendered in a district court or

circuit court of this state, in any county thereof, may be filed
and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court of
any other county, and when so filed and docketed it shall have,
for purposes of lien and enforcement, the same force and effect
as a judgment entered in the district court in such county. . . .
Utah Code Ann. S 78-22-1 (1977).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by Raymond P. L. Cannefax and
Debra

Cannefax

("Cannefaxes") to enjoin Donald W. Clement

and

Ruth L. Clement ("Clements") from selling Cannefaxes1 home at a
Sheriff's
obtained

execution

in

partial

satisfaction

of

a

judgment

by Clements against George W. Barker, Jr. and Liliam

Barker ("Barkers").

Four years prior to Clements1 judgment being

docketed, Barkers sold their interest in the home on contract to
Diane Hodge ("Hodge").

Hodge later sold the home to Cannefaxes

by Warranty Deed after Barker's judgment was docketed.

Clements

claim that since there was a balance owing on the contract when
their judgment was docketed, the judgment constitutes a lien on
Cannefaxes1 home to the extent of the unpaid contract.
Based
included

in

the

upon

stipulated

addendum,

the

-2-

facts,
Honorable

a

copy
Pat

B.

of

which

Brian,

are
Third

District Court Judge, granted Clements1 Motion for Summary Judgment

and

ruled

that

their

judgment

constituted

a

lien

on

Cannefaxes1 home to the extent of the unpaid balance owed Barkers
under the contract, less prior liens and encumbrances.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held that under
the doctrine of

equitable conversion, the seller under a real

estate contract only has the right to receive the purchase price,
which is personal property, and a judgment against the contract
seller is not a lien thereon because Utah Code Ann. S 78-22-1
(1977) only creates a lien on the judgment debtor's real property.

The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and

ordered it to enter summary judgment in favor of Cannefaxes quieting title in them.

Clements then petitioned the Utah Supreme

Court for a Writ of Certiorari which was granted on May 21, 1990.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 28, 1981, Barkers owned real property located
in Salt Lake County (the "Property").
1981, Barkers entered
Hodge

for

the

sale

(R. 105)

On August 28,

into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with
of

the Property

for

$160,000.00, payable

$40,000.00 down and the balance over a period of time with interest.

(R. 106)

A notice of that contrapt was recorded in Salt

Lake County on August 31, 1981.

(R.106)

At the time of the

sale, there were mortgage loan obligations against the property

-3-

in favor of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association ("Prudential") and Continental Bank and Trust Company

("Continental").

(R. 106)
On August 15, 1985, Clements obtained a judgment in the
Seventh

Judicial

District

Court

of Uintah

Barkers in the amount of $70,526.00.

County

(R. 106)

against

the

On August 19,

1985, Clements' Judgment was docketed with the Clerk of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County.
Judgment against Barkers was not appealed.

(R. 106)
(R. 106)

Clements'
On Septem-

ber 25, 1985, immediately prior to the transaction described in
the paragraphs
Property,

which

subject

Estate Contract.

to

follow,

Barkers held

Hodge's

interest

legal

under

the

title

to

Uniform

the
Real

(R. 106-07)

On September 25, 1985, Hodge owed Barkers' $87,747.40
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. The prior obligations to
Prudential and Continental totaled $33,282.50.

(R. 107)

On Sep-

tember 25, 1985, the Barkers gave Hodge a Warranty Deed to the
Property.

The Warranty

Deed was recorded

County Recorder on September

26, 1985.

1

with

(R. 107)

the Salt

Lake

On September

After entering into the contract with Ms. Hodge, the
Barkers gave quit claim deeds to the property to other people
named Barker—presumably their children. On or before September 25, 1985, but prior to the other transactions of September
25, the Barkers received back quit claim deeds to the property
from their quit claim grantees.

-4-

25, 1985f

at the time that Warranty Deed was delivered, Hodge

paid the Barkers $45,000.00, and the Barkers gave Hodge a credit
of $9,464.94.

The mortgage loan balance in favor of Prudential

in the sum of $5,960.20 was paid off, as was the mortgage loan
balance in favor of Continental in the sum of $27,322.30.
107)

(R.

Also on September 25, 1985, Hodge gave a Warranty Deed to

the Property to Cannefaxes.

The Warranty Deed was recorded with

the Salt Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985.

(R. 107)

The two transactions discussed above—the transfer of title from
Barkers

to

Cannefaxes
107-08)

Hodge,

and

took place

the
at

transfer

a single

of

real

title

from

Hodge

estate

closing.

to
(R.

A title search conducted by the settlement agent, Surety

Title Agency, between closing on September 25, 1985, and recording on September 26, 1985, disclosed Clements1 Judgment against
the Barkers.

(R. 108).

More than two years after their judgment was docketed
in Salt
scheduled

Lake County,
on

(R. 142-44).

Clements

Cannefaxes'

caused

home

for

an execution
September

sale

to be

22,

1987.

In response, Cannefaxes filed this action seeking

an injunction against the execution on the basis that Clements1
judgment did not constitute a lien on their home.

-5-

(R. 157-64).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Utah

Supreme

Court

has

consistently

applied

the doctrine of equitable conversion in holding that the seller's
interest under a real estate contract
the

buyer's

interest

interest

is

real

is personal property,

is personal property and

property.

Since

a judgment

against

the

seller's

the seller,

which is a lien on all real property owned by him, is not a lien
on the land previously sold on contract.
2.

Clements1

arguments notwithstanding,

the majority

rule is that a judgment against a contract seller is not a lien
on the

real property

being

sold.

Most

authorities

favor

the

position that no lien should attach to the real property because
it is equitably owned by the buyer and the seller only retains a
security interest for payment of the purchase price.
3.

Utah

is

a

lien

theory

state

meaning

that

when

title is conveyed for security purposes, the lender only obtains
a lien on the property, not

title thereto.

The retention of

title by Barkers under a real estate contract for security purposes should be treated no different than when title is conveyed
to someone other than the owner such as a mortgagee or a beneficiary under a trust deed.

In all three cases a judgment against

the lender should not be a lien on the land.

-6-

4,

The rule making a judgment against a land contract

seller a lien should be rejected because

it puts the burden on

the contract buyer instead of the judgment creditor.

It requires

a contract buyer to decide at his peril who to make the contract
payments to.

If he decides wrong, he may have to pay twice.

A

better rule would be to require the judgment creditor, who has
the burden of collecting the judgment, to take affirmative action
to collect the judgment by execution or garnishment.

Placing the

burden upon the judgment creditor is particularly fair where, as
here, notice of the contract is recorded and the judgment creditor will obtain information on the contract at the same time he
searches the record to determine what real property is owned by
the defendant upon which he can execute.
5.

Even

in those

cases where

the courts

adopt

the

rule advocated by Clements, the buyer can continue to make payments to the seller until he has actual notice of the judgment
lien, and payment of the balance owed on the contract
actual notice of the judgment removes
the payment

without

it as a lien even though

is less than the amount owed on the judgment.

The

buyer does not have to search the judgment records prior to each
payment.

In this case, Clements have the burden of showing that

Cannefaxes had actual notice, and they have not satisfied that
burden

because

the

only

evidence

-7-

is

that

the

title

company

handling the transaction had notice.

There is not even any evi-

dence that the title company was Cannefaxes1
their behalf.

agent or acted on

Even if Clements' judgment is a lienf therefore,

Barkers were paid by Cannefaxes without notice, and Clements execution should be enjoined.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER UTAH LAW, CLEMENT'S JUDGMENT IS NOT
A LIEN UPON CANNEFAX'S HOME BECAUSE UNDER
EQUITABLE CONVERS IONr BARKER1 S INTEREST
WAS PERSONAL PROPERTY AND A JUDGMENT LIEN
ONLY ATTACHES TO REAL PROPERTY.
In Utah, a judgment is a lien upon all real property
owned

by

the

judgment

debtor

at

docketed, or acquired thereafter.

the time

the

judgment

is

As set forth in Utah Code

Ann. S 78-22-1 (1977):
From the time the judgment . . .
docketed . . . it becomes a lien upon
real property of the judgment debtor .
in the county in which the judgment
entered, owned by him at the time or
him thereafter acquired.
(emphasis added).
judgment

Under

lien attaches

that

only

to

property owned by the debtor.

is
all
. .
is
by

section, it is clear
real property,
Clements1

not

that a
personal

judgment did not,

therefore, attach to Cannefaxes1 home because Barkers1

inter-

est therein, as a contract seller, was personal property under

-8-

the doctrine of equitable conversion.

The Utah Supreme Court

and the Utah Court of Appeals have consistently applied the
doctrine

of

equitable

conversion

to hold

that

the seller's

interest under a real estate contract is personal property and
the interest of the buyer, who takes possession of the property, is real property.
In Allred v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 791
(1964), the Utah Supreme Court first adopted equitable conversion and held that the seller's interest under a real estate
contract

is personal property, stating, "[a]s a general rule

an enforceable executory contract of sale has the effect of
converting

the

personalty."

interest

of

393 P. 2d 792.

the vendor

of

real property

to

In that case a husband and wife

sold real and personal property on contract to their son and
his

wife.

The

husband

then

died,

and

the

administrator

claimed the real estate was property of the estate because the
contract was not fully executed at the time of the husband's
death.

This court had no problem in rejecting that argument

on the basis
dent's

that

interest

real property.

equitable

conversion

under the contract

converted

the dece-

to personal property not

It is important to note that the court did not

hold that the estate retained an interest in the real property
to the extent that the contract price was unpaid.

-9-

The

Utah

Supreme

Court

next

clearly

held

Estate of Willson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298
estate

tax

case,

that

the

seller's

interest

In

re

(1972), an

under

estate contract is personal property not real property.

a

real
In so

holding, the court held that the decedent's widow could not
exclude from the estate tax return her dower interest in real
property sold by the decedent on contract because his interest
in the contract was personalty, and stated as follows:
. . . Equity says that from the contract,
even while yet executory, the vendee
acquires a 'real1
right, a right of
property in the land, which though lacking
in legal title, and therefore equitable
only, is none the less the real, beneficial ownership, subject however, to a lien
of the vendor as security for the purchase
price as long as that remains unpaid.
This property in the land, upon the death
of the vendee, descends to the heirsr or
passes to the devisees, and is liable to
the dower of his widow. The vendor stills
holds
the
legal
title, but only as
trustee, and he in turn acquires equitable
ownership of the purchase money; his
property, as viewed by equity is no longer
real estate, in the land, but personal
estate, in the price, and if he dies
before payment, it goes to his administrators, not to his heirs. . . . (emphasis in
original)
Willson at 1300, quoting from Pommeroy Equity Jurisprudence,
105 5th Ed. 1941, at page 135.
The court's holding in Willson was stated at 1300 as follows:
The fact that the seller retains bare
legal title, does not have possession, use
or control of the property, the transfer
-10-

of legal title and record title being
dependent only upon the acts and conduct
of the buyer, it would appear that the
interest of the seller was properly taxed
by the State Tax Commission of Utah as
personal property . . .
In Jelco,

Inc. v. Third Judicial

Dist. Court, 29

Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739, 741 (1973), the Utah Supreme Court
held in a condemnation action involving real property sold on
contract that the buyer was the owner entitled to any increase
in value of the property and that the seller's only right was
to receive the balance owed on the contract for which he held
a security interest in the real property:
In such an executory contract the vendee
(Jelco) acquires all the incidents of
ownership
except
legal title.
He is
therefore in equity properly regarded as
the owner of the property.
Thus, in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary,
where the condemnor takes land subject to
an executory contract, it is the vendee
who is normally entitled to a condemnation
award for the land so taken. It is he who
is
entitled
to
the
benefit
of
any
increase, and who must bear the detriment
of any decrease, in the value of the
property; whereas, the vendor (Jeremy) has
only legal title. In regard to the purchase price, what he is entitled to is to
have it paid in accordance with the terms
of the contract.
He is of course also
entitled to retain the legal title as
security for its performance, and in case
of default, to seek the remedies provided
therein.
511 P.2d 741.

-11-

In

line

with

the

above

application

of

equitable

conversion, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that
the buyer's

interest

under

a real

estate

contract

is

real

property to which a judgment against the buyer constitutes a
lien from the time it is docketed.

In so holding, the court

has determined that the statutory term "real property" in Utah
Code Ann. S 78-22-1 (1977) includes the equitable interest of
a buyer under an installment land sale contract.

In Bill Nay

and Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the lower court
and held that a judgment against a contract buyer was a lien
on his equitable interest in the real property being purchased
by him on contract, as follows:
The legal basis [for the lower court's
decision] is clear.
The interest of a
purchaser under a real estate contract is
an interest in real property that can be
mortgaged.
Lockhart
Co. v. Anderson,
Utahf 646 P.2d 678 (1982).
Upon the same
reasoning this equitable interest is also
subject to the judgment lien prescribed by
U.C.A., 1953, S 78-22-1 Utah Cooperative
Association
v. White
Distributing
and
Supply Co., 120 Utah 603, 237 P.2d 262
(1951)
677 P.2d 1121.
In Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987), this court
again held that the buyer's interest in a real estate contract
is real property against which a judgment against the buyer is
-12-

a lien.

In determining whether the judgment lien attached to

the buyer's interest, the court said it must:
analyze the relative interest of a vendor
and a vendee in the land under a land sale
contract, and specifically the interest of
the [vendee] and the [vendor] prior to the
termination of [the vendee's] interest.
740 P.2d at 1254.
In making that analysis, the court also noted:
As a foundational matter, we note
that a judgment
lien has no greater
dignity in property law than the nature of
the
property
interest
to
which
it
attaches.
In Dahl v. Prince, 119 Utah
556, 561, 230 P.2d 328, 331 (1951), this
court held that "neither [an] attaching
creditor nor an execution creditor is in
the position of a bona fide purchaser for
value." (citations omitted)
740 P.2d 1257.
In holding that a judgment lien against the buyer attaches to
his equitable interest in the real property, the Utah Supreme
Court explained the interests of a buyer and seller under a
land sales contract as follows:
Under
an
installment
land
sale
contract, the vendor retains legal title
as security for the purchase price of the
property.
Oaks v. Kendell, 23 Cal. App.
2d 715, 73 P.2d 1255 (1937); Marks v. City
of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199
(1979).
Nevertheless,
as
a
general
proposition, the vendee is treated as the
owner of the land.
C&J Industries, Inc.
v. Bailey, 618 P.2d 58, 59 (Utah 1980);
-13-

Rush v, Anestos, 104 Idaho 630, 634, 661
P.2d 1229, 1233 (1983). . . .
By retaining the legal title, the
vendor retains an important right in the
land. The doctrine of equitable conversation characterizes the seller's interest
as an interest in personalty and not as
one
in
realty,
whereas
the
vendee's
interest under the executory contract is
deemed an interest in realty . . . .
The vendor's interest is similar to
the security interest of a purchase money
mortgagee.
740 P.2d 1254-55.
In addition to the above Utah Supreme Court decisions

which

interest

have

consistently

under a land

installment

characterized

the

sale contract

seller's

as personal

property and the buyer's as real property, the Utah Court of
Appeals has held in this case and one other that the doctrine
of equitable conversion precludes a judgment from attaching to
real property which the judgment debtor has sold under a valid
and enforceable contract prior to the docketing of the judgment.

In Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987),

the Utah Court of Appeals applied equitable conversion to hold
that

a judgment

against

the

seller

under

an

earnest

money

sales agreement was not a lien on the land because the seller's interest was personal property, not real property:
In the case at bar, Lach executed a
binding earnest money agreement on November 28, 1980. Regardless of the effect of

executing the deed on the same day, the
Earnest
Money
Agreement
precludes
the
attachment of the Bank's judgment lien.
When this agreement was executed, Lach
[the buyer] became the equitable owner of
the property and the judgment debtors, the
Dewsnups [the seller], held only a personalty interest in the property. The Bank's
docketing
of
a
judgment
against
the
Dewsnups on December 12, 1980 did not
create a judgment lien against the property because the Dewsnups did not then
have a real property interest to which the
lien could attach.
Under the uncontroverted facts, and as a matter of law, Lach
owns the property free from any judgment
lien in favor of the Bank. . . .
746 P.2d 805-06.
Notwithstanding Clements' argument that the doctrine
of equitable conversion is a principle in equity which should
only be applied

if

it's application

is equitable, the Utah

courts have consistently applied it in holding that from the
moment the contract is created, the seller's interest is the
right to receive the money, which
the buyer's interest

is personal property, and

is the right to receive the land, upon

payment of the agreed purchase price, which is real property.
Not one Utah case cited to this court has deviated from that
2
principle, regardless of the equities involved.
The court

*
The case of Reynolds v. Van Wagoner, 592 P.2d 593 (Utah
1979) cited at 18-19 of Clements opening Brief as support for
their position that this court has only applied equitable
Footnote continued on next page.
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should not now deviate from that position of consistency and
find that for purposes of a judgment lien the seller's interest is real property because it is contrary to prior case law
and to do so would be inequitable as set forth in Point III of
this Brief.
Furthermore, this court has already held that
buyer's interest under an
real

property

attaches.

to

which

a

installment
judgment

the

land sale contract
lien

against

the

is

buyer

It would be inconsistent with that position to now

hold that the seller's interest is also real property and that
a

judgment

lien

against

the

seller

attaches

property to the prejudice of the buyer.

to

that

real

Logically, both the

buyer and the seller cannot own the property and if this court
has already determined that the buyer does, the seller cannot,
and a judgment against a contract seller should not be a lien

Footnote continued from previous page.
conversion when it is equitable to do so is not on point. In
that case, the doctrine didn't apply because the contract
seller attempted to use it to his advantage to change the contract of sale and prevent the buyer from the relief to which
he was entitled under the contract. There, the contract buyer
had failed to pay the taxes and the seller bought the property
at tax sale. The seller attempted to characterize the buyer's
interest as real property, under equitable conversion, so as
to nullify the buyer's rights under the contract to bring it
current.
-16-

on

land

sold

under

contract

prior

to

the

judgment

being

docketed.
POINT II
OTHER COURTS AND COMMENTATORS FAVOR A RULE
THAT A JUDGMENT LIEN AGAINST A SELLER ON
AN INSTALLMENT LAND SALE CONTRACT DOES NOT
ATTACH TO THE REAL PROPERTY BEING SOLD.
A.

The Majority of Courts
in Other
Jurisdictions Hold That A Judgment
Lien Does Not Attach to Real Property
Sold By the Judgment Debtor On Contract Prior to the Judgment Being
Docketed.

Contrary

to

Clements1

position,

the

majority

of

courts hold that a judgment against a contract seller is not a
lien on real property sold by him on contract prior to the
time the judgment is docketed.
of Appeals, several courts

In addition to the Utah Court

in other jurisdictions have held

that a judgment docketed against a land contract seller after
the contract is entered into is not a lien on the land,

Marks

v. City of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1979)
(n[T]he

interest

retained

by

a

contract of sale is personalty
S 39-1-6 permits a judgment
since

the

converted

judgment

under

an

executory

and not real estate.

Since

lien only upon real estate and

debtors1

to personalty,

vendor

interest

the City's

in

the

property

judgment did

not

was
ripen

into a lien on the real estate involved"); M.L. Gordon Sash
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and Door Co. v. Mormann, 271 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. 1978) (Under a
series of contracts including an option contract entered into
for

the

purchase

of

real

property

before

a

judgment

was

docketed against the seller of the land, the judgment did not
constitute

a

lien on

the

land

even

though

the

option

was

exercised after the judgment was docketed); Clarence M. Bull,
Inc. v. Goldman, 30 Md. App. 665, 353 A.2d 661, 663 (1976) ("A
judgment obtained by a third person against the vendor after
the execution

of

a contract

does not defeat

or

impair

the

purchaser's equitable interest, nor does it constitute a lien
on the purchaser's land."); Mueller v. Novelty Dye Works, 273
Wis. 501, 78 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1956) (Seller's interest under
an installment land sale contract was personal property and a
judgment lien against seller docketed 50 days after contract
signed did not attach to real estate covered by the contract,
but

judgment

creditor

could

use

other procedures

to attach

personal property interest of seller under the contract); Hull
v. Maryland
(Equitable

Casualty
conversion

Co., 79 So.2d
precludes

real property under contract

517, 518-19

judgment

against

from attaching

(Fla. 1954)
seller

of

to land because

seller only owns naked legal title, not an equitable interest
in the land);

Jackson v. Faver, 210 Ga. 58, 77 S.E.2d 728

(1953) (Judgment

creditor against

-18-

land contract seller could

not execute on land which he sold on contract prior to entry
of

judgment

and deeded

to buyer

after

judgment

but

before

execution on judgment); Stecker v. Snyder, 193 P.2d 881, 884
(Colo. 1948) (Attaching creditor of a seller of real property
previously sold on contract has only the right to collect the
contract payments due the seller); Snow Bros. Hardware Co. v.
Ellis, 180 Ark. 238, 21 S.W.2d 162f

163

(1929) (A judgment

lien attaches only to real estate, not a security interest in
real estate, and a judgment

against

a land contract

docketed after the contract was signed
land because the sellers1
a security

seller

is not a lien on the

interest under the contract is only

interest); State Bank of Decatur v. Sanders, 170

S.W. 86, 88-89 (Ark. 1914) (Equitable conversion precludes a
judgment against a land contract seller from attaching to real
property

sold

on

contract

prior

to

the

judgment

being

entered); Cumminqs v. First National Bank of Siqourney, 202
N.W. 556, 556 (Iowa 1925) (A vendor's

interest under a con-

tract for the sale of real property being personal property,
"it necessarily follows that a judgment obtained against the
vendor after the date of the contract does not become a lien
upon the land"); Westinqhouse Lamp Co. v. Ingram, 90 S.E. 837,
838-39 (W.Va. 1916) (Judgment entered against a land contract
seller after he sold real property on contract is not a lien

-19-

on

the

land

because

therein);

Jones

(Judgment

creditor

the buyer

v.

Howard,

cannot

owns

43

execute

the

S.W.
on

equitable

635f

636

land sold

interest

(Mo, 1897)
by

judgment

debtor on contract prior to execution because judgment debtor,
having sold the land, holds title in trust for the buyer and
the seller does not hold an interest in the land that can be
executed on).
B.

In

Commentators Favor The Rule That a Judgment
Entered Against A Contract Land Seller After he
Sells Land on Contract is not a Lien on the
Land,
addition

to

the

courts

that

hold

a

judgment

against a seller under an installment land sales contract does
not constitute a lien on the real property, the commentators
discussing

the

equitable

than

issue
the

favor

that

alternative.

result

because

it

Lacey, Creditors

is more
of

Contract Vendors, 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 645, 656
(hereinafter, Lacy at

Land
(1973)

) Simpson, Legislative Changes in the

Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract, 44 Yale L.J. 559,
578-79
Real

(1935) (hereinafter Simpson at

Property

§

After discussing

11.29

at

82-83,

86

); and III Am. Law
(A. Casner

Ed.

1952).

the pros and cons of the two rules for and

against allowing a judgment against the seller to be a lien on
land he sold on contract before entry of the judgment, Lacey
concludes that no lien should attach:
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I submit that the difference between real
and personal property, or more to the
point, between general ownership of land
and the contractual claim to a money
payment, is not just a conceptual distinction but has a functional justification.
First, ownership of land is a matter of
official record everywhere in the United
States.
Although many land contracts and
assignments of contract are recorded, with
varying
effect
from
state
to
state,
perhaps
more
are
not.
Furthermore,
because payments on the contract will very
seldom be a matter of record, a ruling
treating
vendor's
interests
like
real
property for purposes of judgment liens
and
levies of
execution will produce
disputes about validity and priority that
must be resolved by the uncertain determinative of parol evidence.
Even more
importantly, a rule that a judgment is a
lien on the vendor's interest creates much
undesirable uncertainty about the rights
and duties of third persons. A purchaser
should not be required to decide, at his
peril, between the rival, informal claims
of his vendor and of his vendor's creditor, and perhaps of his assignee, nor
should he be put to the trouble of an
interpleader suit, nor be given an excuse
to avoid all payments. There is certainly
much to be said
for permitting, and
requiring, a purchaser to pay in accordance with his contract until officially
ordered to do otherwise.
Lacey at 656.
Similarly, Simpson states at 579:
Some courts have held, and, it would seem,
with sound
reason,
that
the vendor's
judgment
creditors
acquire
no
liens
against the purchasers even though the
purchase price is unpaid and the purchaser
knows of the judgment.
This works no
injustice upon the creditors, who may
-21-

proceed
by
garnishment
to
reach
the
purchase money or by bill for equitable
execution to reach both purchase money and
vendor's lien.
There is no good reason, therefore, for this court
to ignore the principle of equitable conversion which it has
consistently adopted and hold that Clements' judgment against
Barkers constitutes
when Clements
as

opposed

a lien on Cannefaxes' home.

Especially

(who are parties to the lawsuit with Barkers),

to

Cannefaxes

(who

are

not), are

in

a

better

position to know about the judgment and the remedies available
for collecting

the same.

Specifically, Clements had collec-

tion

available

to

remedies

Barkers'

interest

in

the

payments thereunder, which

them,

contract

including
or

execution

garnishment

of

on
the

if exercised promptly, would have

allowed Clements to realize upon Barkers' interest under the
contract.

Instead, Clements waited two years before they used

those remedies and during that time Barkers' contract interest
was paid.
not

be

In all equity, Clements' lack of diligence should

rewarded

with

a lien on Cannefaxes' home.

Neither

should Cannefaxes or any other contract buyer be put to the
burden of deciding

at his peril who to make the payments to

under the contract until officially ordered to do so by way of
an execution or garnishment proceeding.
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POINT III
THERE ARE GOOD POLICY REASONS WHY
A
JUDGMENT AGAINST A CONTRACT SELLER SHOULD
NOT BE A LIEN ON THE REAL PROPERTY BEING
SOLD UNDER CONTRACT.
A.

As

Barkers Only Interest in the Land Under the
Contract was a Security Interest to Which a
Judgment Lien Should Not Attach.
stated

in Butler v. Wilkinson,

740 P.2d 1244,

1255 (Utah 1987), "[t]he vendor's interest is similar to the
security

interest of a purchase money mortgagee."

In sub-

stance, the seller's interest under an installment land sale
contract is no different than the interest of a lender under a
3
mortgage or a trust deed.

In each case the lender holds only

a security interest even though title may be conveyed for the
benefit of the lender, i.e. an outright deed
lender intended as a mortgage.

in favor of a

Because Utah is a lien theory

state, if Barkers and Hodge had used a trust deed or mortgage,
there would be no question that Barkers' only interest in the
property is a lien (not title thereto) even though the real
property would have been conveyed by Hodge for the benefit of
3

As further evidence that Barkers only held a security
interest in the property, they could not have involuntarily
forfeited Hodge's interest because she had too much equity;
having paid more than 25% of the contract price.
Barkers'
only recourse on default was, therefore, like that of a
mortgagee—foreclose the contract.
Perkins v. Spencer, 243
P.2d 446 (Utah 1952).
-23-

the Barkers.

Bvbee v. Stuart, 189 P.2d 118, 123 (Utah 1948);

Kiar v. Brimlev, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (1972) (a deed on
its face conveying the property outright, but pursuant to an
oral agreement that the deed was intended only as a mortgage,
conveys only a lien, not title to the property); and I BYU
Summary of Utah Real Property Lawf § 9.36 at 316.

It follows

then that a judgment against a lender holding a mortgage or
the beneficial

interest under a trust deed on real property

does not constitute a lien upon that real property.

Neither

should a judgment against a contract seller, who holds only a
security

interest, be

would

to treat

be

a lien on the

it different

land because to do so

from other security devices

commonly used and elevate form over substance.
B.

A Judgment Against a Contract Seller Should Not
be a Lien Because It Wrongfully Puts the Burden
of Collecting the Judgment on the Contract
Buyer Instead of the Judgment Creditor.

The rule advocated by Clements should not be adopted
because it puts the burden on the contract buyer to decide who
the contract payments should be made to at his peril.

If he

decides wrong, the contract buyer will be required to pay the
contract
second,

twice,

once

in payment

of

in

satisfaction

of

the

contract

and

the contract seller's judgments.

In

addition, a technical application of the rule would require a

-24-

contract

buyer

to search

the

judgment

records

before

every

payment is made in order to avoid paying the wrong person.

In

the event a judgment is found and the contract seller does not
agree as to how payment should be made, the buyer would then
be forced to incur the burden and expense of an interpleader
action which it should not be required to do.
The

record

is

clear

that

a

notice

of

Barkers1

contract was recorded prior to the time Clements1 judgment was
docketed in Salt Lake County.
constructive

notice

of

Because a judgment creditor has

recorded

documents

affecting

the

debtors1 real property under Utah Code Ann. S 57-3-2 (1953, as
amended),

law does not elevate a judgment
4
creditor to the status of a good faith purchaser for value,
there

and because Utah

is good

judgment

lien

justification for placing the burden upon the
holder

to

enforce

his

rights

as

requiring the contract buyer to act at his peril.
the judgment
seller's
same.

opposed

to

Certainly

lien holder can obtain a lien on the contract

interest by taking the proper steps to perfect the

All he has to do is execute on the seller's interest in

4

Dahl v. Prince, 119 Utah 556, 561, 230 P.2d 328, 331
(1951) (a judgment creditor does not qualify as a good faith
purchaser); and Kartchner v. State Tax Commission, 4 Utah 2d
382, 294 P.2d 790 (1956) (a judgment lien does not attach to
real property conveyed by the judgment debtor prior to the
lien being docketed by an unrecorded deed).
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the

contract

or

Lacey at 662.
extra burden

garnish

the

The judgment
because

payments

as

they

become

due.

lien holder will be put to no

in searching

the

records

to determine

what real property is owned by the judgment debtor, he should
at the same time discover the recorded notice of contract and
become

aware

of

the

judgment

debtors1

entitlement

to

the

payments under the contract, which by execution or garnishment, he may have applied towards payment on the judgment.
That
jurisdiction
judgment

is exactly

Clements

cite

is a lien on

the course
as support

followed
for

the

the contract seller's

by Oregon, a
rule

that

interest.

a
As

stated by the Oregon Supreme Court in May v. Emerson, 96 P.
454, (1908), a case cited by Clements:
However, the docketing of the judgment is
not constructive notice to [the contract
buyer].
He is not bound to search the
records every time he makes a payment. He
is entitled to the benefit of all payments
made to the lender until he has actual
knowledge of the lien.
(citations omitted).
Defendant [the contract buyer] was
not required to make the payments to
plaintiff
[judgment
creditor] as they
matured,
until
plaintiff
acquired
the
vendor1s rights. The vendee cannot assume
to determine for himself, and at his risk,
the controversy between plaintiff and his
debtor; and defendant need not go into
equity to settle their differences.
He
may stand upon his contract, and when
plaintiff has acquired the vendor's right
to the money by perfecting
title in
-26-

himself, the defendant will
in making payment to him.

be justified

96 P. 454-55,
Because under May and other Oregon cases, the rights
of a contract buyer in Oregon were uncertain after a judgment
was entered against the contract seller, the Oregon legislature resolved the problem with a statute which provides that
the recorded interests of a contract buyer take priority over
a judgment
interest

lien against the seller,

is recorded

before

the

if the buyer's contract

judgment

is entered.

The

statute still allows the judgment creditor to execute on the
seller's interest in the contract.

Quinn v. Southern Pacific

Transportation Co. , 711 P.2d 137, 138-39 (Ore. App. 1985).

As

public policy, therefore, Oregon has in the end decided it is
better to put the burden on the judgment creditor by requiring
him to use his collection remedies instead of creating a lien
on the seller's interest to the detriment of the buyer.

The

Court here should adopt a similar rule.
In the end analysis there are two themes underlying
the opposite rules adopted by the courts creating a lien on
the

sellers

653-55.

The

interest
first

and

the

rule

of

theme, supporting

no

Lacey

at

Clements position,

is

"don1t-let-the-vendor-escape-his-debts."
second,

supporting

Cannefaxes1

position,

-27-

lien.

Id.

at

655.

The

is "don1t-make-the-

purchaser-pay-twice."

Id.

As

a corollary

to

the

second

theme, a purchaser shouldn't be burdened with a lien on his
land or be

forced

into deciding

who

to pay

at his peril.

Adoption of one rule versus the other does not preclude the
judgment creditor from collecting his debt from the sellers1
assets.
rules

On the contrary, the only difference between the two

is that

requires

some

one

allows

additional

an

immediate

act

on

the

lien

part

and

of

the other

the

judgment

creditor to perfect his rights in the seller's property, such
as execution or garnishment.
the

immediate

judgment

In light of the fact that even

lien route requires an affirmative act by the

creditor—notification

to

the

buyer—it

is

more

equitable to require that act be in the form of execution or
garnishment. Then there is no question.
has clearly perfected his lien

The judgment creditor

in the seller's property and

the buyer knows who to pay, having been directed to do so by
governmental authority.
judgment

creditor

Certainly, as in this case, where the

waits

two

years

to execute,

his

lack of

diligence should not be rewarded with a lien on the residence
of

a

third

party.

This

court

should,

Clements from executing on Cannefaxes home.

-28-

therefore,

enjoin

POINT IV
EVEN IF THE COURT HOLDS THAT CLEMENTS'
JUDGMENT IS A LIENr THE EXECUTION SHOULD BE
ENJOINED BECAUSE CLEMENTS HAVE FAILED TO
PROVE THAT CANNEFAXES HAD ACTUAL NOTICE OF
THE JUDGMENT WHEN THEY BOUGHT THE HOUSE FROM
HODGE.
Even if this Court adopts the rule creating a lien
interest, however, Clements1 execu-

on the contract seller's
tion

should

still

be enjoined because

under

that

rule

the

buyer can continue to make payments to the seller until he has
actual notice of the judgment lien, and payment of the balance
owed on the contract without actual notice of the judgment
removes it as a lien even though the payment is less than the
amount owed on the judgment.
1377,

1381

(Utah

Here,

Clements

App.

have

Cannefax v. Clement, 786 P.2d

1990) quoting

the

burden

of

from

Simpson

proving

at 578.

Cannefaxes

had

actual notice, and they have not satisfied that burden because
the

only

evidence

is

that

transaction had notice.
the

title

behalf.
especially

the

title

company

where,

simply
as

the

There is not even any evidence that

company was Cannefaxes' agent
Clements

handling

have

not

here, a higher

or acted

carried
standard

their
of

on

their

burden,
proof

of

actual notice should be required before a contract buyer loses
his house because of a judgment against the seller.
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Chistie

v. Morris, 119 Mont. 383, 176 P.2d
judgment

was

660

(1946)

sellers1

a lien on the contract

(even though
interest, the

buyer still got credit for payments made on the contract after
the judgment was entered because the judgment creditor failed
to carry

its burden of proving

the buyer had actual notice

because the only evidence was that the buyer had a copy of an
abstract at the time of his payments).
failed

to

prove

that

Cannefaxes

had

Because Clements have
actual

notice

of

the

judgment against Barkers, even if this court holds the judgment

is a lien, Clements should not be able to enforce the

lien on Cannefaxes1 home and the execution should be enjoined.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondents Raymond P.L.
Cannefax

and

court sustain

Debra

Cannefax

respectfully

request

the decision of the Utah Court

that

of Appeals

the
in

this action and remand it to the District Court for entry of a
summary judgment in their favor quieting title to the subject
real

property

in

them

and

against

Clements.
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STEVEN H, LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Defendants
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE CF UTAH
i

RAYMOND P.L. CANNEFAX and DEBRA J
CANNEFAX,
)
Plaintiffs,

DONA-J A . CLEMENT and RUTH L.
CLEMENT,
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Having considered the above pleadings and oral

argument/ and good cause appearing/
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants1 Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted; and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
judgment be, and hereby is/ entered in favor of defendants and
against plaintiffs on the Complaint on file herein, and the
Complaint is hereby dismissed; and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

As a matter of law, a contract vendor of real

property does retain an interest in the real property which is
subject to the lien of a judgment against him.
2.

When defendants1 Judgment against George W. Barker,

Jr. and Lila Mr. Barker was docketed with the Clerk of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County on August 19/ 1985,
that Judgment created a valid lien against the property at 2563
East Lockhart Road in Salt Lake County, Utah, which property is
more particularly described in paragraph 5 of the Verified
Complaint herein.
3.

In this case/ in light of Stipulated Fact No. 14,

it is equitable that the judgment lien created when said Judgment
was docketed in Salt Lake County bound the property to the extent
of the amount unpaid on the Uniform Real Estate Contract between
the Barkers, as sellers, and Diane Hodge, as buyer, on September
25, 1985, (the date Diane Hodge received a warranty deed from the
Barkers and gave a warranty deed to plaintiffs), less the amount
of the prior encumbra ^es on the property in favor of Prudential
2

Federal Savings & L 3 a n Assoc ia t io n a n d C o n tin e nt a1 Ba nk a n • 3 T r u st
Company ; t: :::) * :i t:
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LI 15 FURTHER ORDERED :na': fc.he temporary
effect

in this case should be,.

i hereby

i« /
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My

I

M

i

'

injunctioa in

dissolved.

'" < u 3

B'J "[lib C O U R T :
I ^ / v. i. ; ;;; * 'ic<u
7he /Hon. Pat B . Br :i a n """""""""*"""""
District Judge
Approved as to form:

M
Rodney M. Pipella
Attorney for Plaintiffs

3

BRUCE E. COKE, Bar No. 0694
STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Defendants
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND P.L. CANNEFAX and
DEBRA CANNEFAX,

]
STIPULATED FACTS

Plaintiffs,

vs.

)

1

DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH L.
CLEMENT,

)

Civil No. C87-6232

)

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Rodney M.
Pipella, and defendants, by and through their attorneys, Steven
H. Lybbert and Bruce E. Coke of Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, stipulate
to the following facts.

In doing so, counsel agree that other

facts not stipulated to may be relevant to the issues raised in
the pleadings.
STIPULATED FACTS
1.

On August 28, 1981, George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila

M. Barker ("the Barkers") were fee simple owners of the real
property described in paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' Verified
Complaint ("the Lockhart Road property").
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Hodge's interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.1
9-

On September 25, 1985, Diane Hodge owed $87,747.40

under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the Barkers.

The prior

obligations to Prudential and Continental totaled $33,282.50.
10.

On September 25, 1985, the Barkers gave a Warranty

Deed to the Property to Diane Hodge.

The Warranty Deed was

recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985
as Entry No. 4142674 at Book No. 5694, beginning at Page 1268.
11.

On September 25, 1985, at the time of delivery of

the Warranty Deed referred to in paragraph 10, Diane Hodge paid
the Barkers $45,000.00, and the Barkers gave Ms. Hodge a credit
of $9,464.94.

The mortgage loan balance in favor of Prudential

in the sum of $5,960.20 was paid off, as was the mortgage loan
balance in favor of Continental in the sum of $27,322.30.
12.

Also on September 25, 1985, Diane

Hodge gave a

Warranty Deed to the Property to plaintiffs Raymond P.L. Cannefax
and Debra Cannefax.

The Warranty Deed was recorded with the Salt

Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985, as Entry No. 4142675
at Book No. 5694, beginning at Page 1270.
13.

The two transactions discussed above—the transfer

of title from the Barkers to Diane Hodge, and the transfer of
title from Diane Hodge to plaintiffs—took place at a single real
estate closing.

A true and correct copy of the U.S. Department

1. After entering into the contract with Ms. Hodge, the Barkers
gave quit claim deeds to the property to other people named
Barker—presumably their children. On or before September 25,
1985, but prior to the other transactions of September 25, the
Barkers received back quit claim deeds to the property from their
quit claim grantees.
-3-

of

"""'"'"1 "ml l U m , |

in,,.,

MhMiieiiL statement between

Diane H o d g e and plaintiffs is attached h e r e t o .
14.

A title search conducted by the settlement agent,

Surety T i t l e Agency, between closing o n September 25, 1985 and
recording o n September 26, 1985 disclosed d e f e n d a n t s ' Judgment
against the B a r k e r s .

Dated this

jffl d a y O1 f r > <=> ^ o ^ 5 e j r 1 • = n •?

AWTorney for

l^i -*rj 1 hin

l^

Plaintiffs

' d.ny ,,,f December, 1987.
NYGAARI • COKE & VINCENT

-trfaJ~~

Steven f I 1 y bfcrerT
Attor 1 iev s for Defendants
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CUe as 786 P.2d 137/ (t'tah App. 1990)

the limits of the judicial reshaping" of legislative enactments by substantially rewnting the ordinance" Id at l&v* , : accord
Mussel ma n r Commonwealth 705 S W 2d
476. 477 (Ky 19*6) ("[Cllearly the judiciary
lacks power to add new phra.se> to a <tatute to provide a new meaning neces.^arv to
render the statute constitutional ")

broad and facially invalid.11 The subsection may not. therefore, be enforced
again.^t Huber or anyone else See Brockett i Spokane Arcades. Inc.. 472 US 491,
503-04. 105 S Ct. 2794. 2801-02. S6 L.Ed.2d
394 '19*5).
T h e c o r n i c t l o n 1S reversed

We are well aware of our responsibility
to construe statutes and ordinances so as
to earn out legislative intent while avoiding constitutional defects
Sec hi re a
Criminal Investigation, 754 P 2d 633. 640
(Utah 1988), In re Boyer. 636 P 2d 10*5.
10*8 (Utah 1981); see also Swoboda. 658
S W 2d at 25 However, we will not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language
in order to reach a constitutional construction Willden. 76* P 2d at 45* In light of
the municipality s use of the expansive
term "abusive language" and its express
intent to penalize speech that merely annoys, inconveniences, or alarms persons
who may not even be its targets, unrestricted by the addressee s likely response,
we decline to narrow the scope of Logan
City Ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) under the
guise of judicial construction
Like the
court in Conchito, 521 P 2d at 1388, we do
not confuse the power to construe with the
power to legislate See also Musselman.
705 S.W.2d at 477 It is for the municipality, not for this court, to fashion a narrowly
drawn ordinance that criminalizes unprotected speech as deemed necessary by city
officials.

DAVIDSON and GARFF, JJ . concur

Raymond P.L. CANNEFAX and Debra
Cfc*\s\*CsL*, Ptauvtvfts wvd . \ w e l t a \ t s .
v.
Donald W. CLEMENT and Ruth L.
Clement, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 8901 ^2-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 2. 1990.

Because Logan City Ordinance 12-89(2)(D) is susceptible of application to substantial amounts of speech which, though
perhaps vulgar or insulting, are nonetheless protected, it is constitutionally over-

Purchasers who had acquired property
from contract vendee brought quiet title
action against contract vendors' creditors.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County.
Pat B Brian. J . rendered summary judg-

12. In contrast, the Oklahoma court recenth de
clined to hold facialK overbroad an ordinance
expressly punishing "abusive or violent lan-

Cuv of Tulsa. 763 P 2d 700, 701 (Okla Cnm.App
1988)

tude." The court concluded that the latter
phrase in the ordinance, as previouslv construed to require conduct that incites violence
or tends to provoke others to break the peace,
was within the boundaries set bv Chaplinskv
and later "fighting words" cases. Harrington v

13. In light of our disposition of this case on the
first amendment overbreadth issue, we need not
reach the other important issues presented by
Huber. including his claims that the ordinance
is unconstitutionally vague and that, even if
narrow Iv construed as punishing only "fighting
words.' the ordinance cannot constitutionally
be applied to his speech
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meni in favor of creditors, and purchasers
appealed. The Court of .Appeals. Billings.
J., held that, under doctrine of eouitanie
conversion, vendors' retained interest under the contract was not real property, and
thus docketed judgment did not create a
judgment lien airams* -.•• proper y.
Reversed w;tn direction.
Jackson. J., filed a concurring opinion,
J. Robert Buiiock. Senior District
Judge, filed a «1is sen ting opinion.

1 ^ • n iJ o i' (ii HJ \ u r v h a s e r <. = "> J
Eu stable '"PA er^ion" doctrine provide? that, once parties nave entered into a
binding and enforceable land sale contract.
purchaser's interest in the contract is said
to be real property and vendor's retained
interest is characterized as persona! property, and the rights of the parties are evaluated a- if :he conveyance had been made.
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Judgment c=7^0»3i
Under doctrine of equitable conversion,
vendors retained interest under a uniform
real estate contract was not real property,
and thus docketed judgment against the
vendors did not create a judgment lien
against the property. U.C. A. 1953, 78-22-1.

Rodney M. Pipella (argued), Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and appellants..
Steven H. Lybbert (argued). Salt Lake
City, for defendants and respondents.
Bet >r* LSIL.LiN(J BULLOCK1, JJ.

1 \« k;*1 >\ ind

OPINION
BILLINGS. Judge
Raymond and Deora Cannefax ("Cannefaxes") appeal a summary judgment en1.

J. Robert Bullock Senior District Judge, sii
ting bv special appointment our.uaru to I, rah

?d SFRIES

tered against them m their ouiet title action
and in tuvor of ih>nnld and Ruth Clement
'"Clements"). In granting summary judgment, the court held that a seller's retained
!e«ja! title to real property under an exec< it«-rv land sale contract was "real property" and. therefore, that a judgment docketed by the Clements, the seller's creditors,
was a hen against the property pursuant to
Utah Code Ann, $ > - 2 2 - i G>7i. We reverse.
George W. Barker. Jr. and Liia M. Barker ("Barkers"* were fee simple owners of
the Lockhart Road Property at issue in this
ouiet title action. In 19M. the Barkers
entered into a uniform real estate contract
to sell their property to Diane Hodge ("Ms.
Hodge"* for >lh"0.ooo. Ms. Hodge paid
>4n,o(H) to the Barker-- at the time of the
sale and she was to pay the balance over
the contract term
On August 31. 19M,
M>. Hodge recorded a notice of her i ini
form real estate contract.
Four years later, the 1 'lements < /btatned
a judgment against the Barkers for 570,526
which was docketed in August 1985. The
stipulated facts show no attempt by the
Clements to execute against the Barkers'
retained interest in the Lockhart Road
Property nor any attempt to garnish the
proceeds Ms. Hodge paid to the Barkers
during the executory period of the uniform
real estate contract.
On September 25. 1985. Ms. Hodge paid
the remaining amount due under her uniform real estate contract with the Barkers.
satisfied prior obligations on the Lockhart
Road Property, and the Barkers deeded the
property to her. At the same meeting, Ms.
Hodge sold the property to the Cannefaxes
and gave them a warranty deed to the
Lockhart Road Property. After the dual
closings were completed, Surety Title conducted a title search which disclosed the
Clements' judgment docketed against the
Barkers. This is the first mention in the
stipulated facts of any actual knowledge of
the Clements' judgment..
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(20) i 1 W V

CANNEFAX v. CLEMENT
Cite as 78* P2d 1377 UtahApp 1990)

Subsequently the Clements obtained d
writ of execution against the LOCK hart
Road Propertv then owned in fet- >impie b\
the Cannefaxes In r^spon>e the Cannefaxtb brought thi^ quiet title actum
The trial court granted ^umman judgment in favor of the Clements noiding
their judgment was a hen on the Lock hart
Road Property to the extent of $54 4M 94
the amount which remained unpaid on the
uniform real estate contract between their
judgment debtors, the Barkers and Ms.
Hodge on September 25. 19v5 the date the
Barkers deeded Ms Hodge the property
[I] We find the trial court s ruling contrary to the doctrine of equitable conversion which ib the law in Utah Under the
doctrine of equitable conversion, once parties have entered into a binding and enforceab)e land sa)e contract, the buyers
interest in the contract is said to be real
property and the seller s retained interest
is characterized as personal propertv R.
Cunningham. W Stoebuck. & D ,,T'hitman,
The Law of Property § 10 13. at 698 (1984).
The rights of the parties are evaluated as if
the conveyance had been made, h McChntock. McClmtock on Equity § 106, at 284
(1948) [hereinafter "McClmtock on Equi-

Utah 1379

was persona/ propertv. not rea/ property,
for mneritance tax purpo>es 499 P 2d at
131 H i-i > 1
The court applied the doctrine of equitanie conversion in a condemnation context m Jticn ' Thtm Judicial Dist Court.
29 Utah 2d 472. ill P 2d 739 <iy73» in
Jclco. both the buyer and the seller under
an executory land sale contract claimed a
right to the increase in value of the land
which had been condemned
The court
held the buyer was the owner of the land,
and thus he was entitled to the condemnation proceeds 511 P 2d at 741 In describing the status of the vendor under the
contract the court stated, "the vendor
has only legal title In regard to the purcha>e price, what he is entitled to is to have
it paid in accordance with the terms of the
contract' Id. See. also Bill Xay & Sons
Excavating v Xeetey Constr. Co. 677 P2d
1120. 1121 (Utah 1984) ("The interest of a
purchaser under a real estate contract is an
interest in real property
").

ty'l

Contrary to the claims made by the dissent, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently applied the doctrine of equitable conversion characterizing the seller's interest
under an executory land sale contract as
personal property and the buyer's interest
as real property 2

The Utah Supreme Court first adopted
the doctrine of equitable conversion in
Allred v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396. 393 P 2d
791 (1964). The court characterized the
seller's interest under a land sale contract
as personalty, stating, t4[a]s a general rule
an enforceable executory contract of sale
has the effect of converting the interest of
the vendor of real property to personalty."
393 P26 at 792. Ag&n in In re Estate of
Willson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P 2d 1298
(1972), the court clearly held that the interest of a seller under a land sale contract

The Utah Supreme Court recently applied the doctrine of equitable conversion in
determining the rights of judgment creditors under an executory land sale contract
in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P 2d 1244
(Utah 1987). In Butler, the court squarely
held that the buyer's interest under the
executory land sale contract was an interest in real property to which judgment hens
cou)d attach. Justice Stewart stated: "The
doctrine of equitable conversion characterizes the seller's interest as an interest in
personalty and not as one in realty, where-

2. The dissent ignores the previous precedent,
and rather relies upon its interpretation of
Reynolds v Van Wagoner, 592 P 2d 593 (Utah
1979). claiming the Utah court chose not to
applv the doctrine of equitable conversion in,
this case because "it would have led to an inequitable result inconsistent with the contractual

intent of the parties." We disagree with the
dissent's reading of this case. The Utah Supreme Court in Reynolds did not utilize the
doctrine of equitable conversion because the
case focused on abandonment of contractual
rights not equitable conversion Id. at 594.

i;jS()
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as the vendee's interest ui ider the executory contract is deemed an interest in
realty." Id. at 1255. Furtner clarifying
the doctrine of equitable conversion as it
affects judgment creditors, he continued;
I'nder the doctrine of equitable <'o[:wrs".'»n. a vendee under a uniform rea» estate contract ot.tains an equitable interest in the land ;t>eif. even though the
vendor retains the legal title. The
vendee is said to convert the monetary
interest that he has in the property to an
interest in real estate so that he may
invoke the powers of an equity court to
compel specific performance of the real
estate contract. By a parity of reasoning, the vendor under such a rtoitrawf
is deemed to hare ronrerted his interest
in 'he land that is fhe suhjert of the
contract to a monetary or legal interest
Id. at n. 5 temphasis added >. Tl u • court
further detailed the nature of the interest
retained by the .seller under a land s; ue
contract, stating:
Under an installment land sale contract, the cendor retains legal title as
security for the purchase price of the
property.
Oaks c. Kendall. 23 Cal.
App.2d 715. 73 P.2d 1255 {1937}; Marks
c. City of Tucumean, 93 N.M. 4. 595
P.2d 1199 <1979). Nevertheless, as a
general proposition, the vendee is treated
as the owner of the land. . . .
The vendor's interest is similar to the
security interest of a purchase money
mortgagee.
Id. at 1254-55 (emphasis added).
The supreme court, in Butler concluded
the buyer under a binding executory land
sale contract has an interest in real property to which judgment liens may attach as
to any other real property interest but subject to the seller's prior lien. "By a parity
of reasoning," the court concluded that the
seller's interest under the contract is merely the right to receive the proceeds under
the contract secured by his retained legal
title similar to the "security interest of a
purchase money mortgagee." Id. at 1,255.

ni ««f Kl L>

In ButU t\ Justice Stewart relied upon
Marks >\ t'i'u of Turn mean. 93 N.M. 4,
595 F 2d 119H I!979I.

In Marks, the New

Mexico court applied the doctrine of equitable conversion and held that the interest r^tameo hv the vendor under a land
sale enruract is personalty ami not real
estate anu thus that a judgment docketed
bv a • 'realtor .>f the seller during the executory pert* >d of the contract had no effect
on the interest of a subsequent purchaser
oi the prop* Ttv, 595 P.2d 1201-02.
[21 The dissent, claims Butler supports
its holding that a judgment hen docketed
against the seder's interest under a unib >rm real estate contract survives as a lien
against the land even though all proceeds
have previously been paid to the judgment
deb tor-seder under the contract and the
property has been deeded to a subsequent
purchaser for value. We disagree. The
dissent relies on the following language
from B er: "Ithe seller has] a contract
right to „ . take back the vendee's interests if the vendee defaults. The vendor
also has an interest
measured by the
amount the vendee owes under the contract." Butler, 740 P„2d at 1255 (citation
omitted). This language is consistent with
our view of the nature of the seller's retained interest, not the dissent's. The seller has retained legal title as security to
insure that he or she receives the payments
due under the contract; if the buyer should
default, the seller's title will not be released to the buyer. This is the extent of
the seller's retained interest—which, under
the doctrine of equitable conversion, is not
in the nature of real property such that
hens can attach under section 7S-22-1.
This court's recent decision in Lach v.
Deseret Bank, "46 P.2d 802 (Utah Ct.App.
1987), adopts our reading of Butler, In
dicta, this court concluded that a judgment
lien docketed against a seller's interest under a uniform real estate contract did not
affect the rights of the buyer under that
contract. Id. at 805. Our language that
"no judgment lien can be created by a
judgment docketed against a seller after

CANNEFAX v CLEMENT
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Cite as 78* P 2d 137:7 II u h App. !**))

the seller executes a binding earnest money contract." id., however, needs amplification. The docketed judgment does not become a lien under the statute because the
seller's retained legal title is nut real property.
We believe I tan authority supports the
following analysis of this case. The Barkers entered into a uniform real estate contract to sell the Lockhart Road Property to
Ms. Hodge before the Clements docketed
their judgment. Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the Barkers retained
only bare le^rai title to the property as
security to receive the payment of the proceeds due from Ms. Hodge under the contract. Thus, the Clements' docketed judgment did not create a judgment lien against
the Lockhart Road Property.
The three jurisdictions relied upon by the
dissent. Nebraska. Idaho and Oregon, have
held that a judgment creditor of a contract
seller will be given a lien in the property to
the extent of the unpaid amounts due under the contract. Monroe v. Lincoln City
Employees Credit Union, 203 Neb. 702.
279 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1979); First Sec.
Bank r. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d
386, 389 (1967): Heidcr v. Diet:, 234 Or.
105. 380 P.2d 619. 624 (1963) (en banc).
This rule has been qualified, however, to
allow a purchaser to continue to make payments pursuant to his contract until he is
given actual notice of the judgment lien.
The buyer is not required to search the
records before he makes his payments under the contract. Lacy. Creditors of Land
Contract Vendors, 24 Case W. Res. L. Re v.
645, 647 (1973) [hereinafter "Lacy. 24 Case
W.Res.L.Rev. 645"]; Simpson. Legislative
Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract, 44 Vaie L.J. 559, 578
(1935) [hereinafter "Simpson, 44 Yale L.J.
559"]. Furthermore, any lien acquired by
the judgment creditor is "discharged by
payment of the balance of the purchase
money due although less than the amount
of the judgment." Id.; see also 3 Am.Law
Real Property § 11.29. at 86 (A. Casner ed.
1952) [hereinafter "3 Am.Law Real Property"].

Thus, not even the "ruie" relied u:»on by
the dissent supports its position. There are
no facts in the record to support a finding
that Ms. Htxige had actual notice ...f the
''lements' judgment before ^he paid a:l proceeds due the Barkers as seiier- .;:.d».*r the
contract.
Furthermore, the ruie relied up«»n r»y the
dissent is not the majority ruie. nor the
ruie in L'tah. The following jurisdictions
have held that a judgment lien against the
seller's interest is not an encumbrance on
the buyer's property interest under a land
sale contract: Marks v. City or' Tuvnmcan. W N.M. 4. 595 P.2a ILM. 1202 (1979);
Mueller r. Xovclty Dye Works, 273 Wis.
5<)1. 7s N.W.2d *bl. S>4 (1956): Sleeker v.
Snyder, lib Colo. 153. 193 P.2d 881. 884
1194b); Snow Bros. Hardware Co. v. Ellis,
i>o Ark. 238. 21 S.W.2d 162. 163 (1929):
see also Simpson. 44 Yale L.J. 559. 579 nn.
132. 133 and ca>es cited therein.
More importantly, all of these vintage
cases dealing with creditor's rights under
an executory land sale contract turned on
the peculiar facts presented and do not
undertake a reasoned discussion of the application of the doctrine of equitabie conversion in dealing with third party creditors. Of more assistance are the commentators who have written on the topic.
These commentators criticize the approach
taken by the dissent and approve the one
advocated herein.
Discussing the conceptual framework
created by the doctrine of equitable conversion in the judgment creditor context, one
author states:
The rights of creditors of the vendor or
purchaser to reach the interest of their
debtor in the land contracted to be sold
or purchased depend in large part on the
theory of equitable conversion. Since on
that theory, the purchaser is regarded as
owner of the land and debtor for the
purchase money and the vendor as holding legal title as security for payment by
the purchaser, it logically follows that
creditors of the purchaser should be able
to reach the land subject to the vendor's
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lien thereon, while creditors of the vendor should he able to reach the land
only to the extent of the vendor's security interest.
3 Am.Law Real Property § 11.29. at 88
(emphasis added). See also McClintock on
Equity § 106, at 286.
Several commentators have explicitly endorsed the cases that refuse to allow a
vendor's judgment creditors to acquire a
lien as against the purchaser under an executory land sale contract even though the
purchase price is unpaid and the purchaser
has actual knowledge of the judgment lien.
3 Am.Law Real Property § 11.29, at 86;
Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559. 579; Lacy, 24
Case W.Res.L.Rev. 645, 662. "This works
no injustice upon the creditors, who may
proceed by garnishment to reach the purchase money or by bill for equitable execution to reach both purchase money and
vendor's lien." 3 Am.Law Real Property
§ 11.29, at 86. Another commentator
states:
[I]t is difficult to set
rchaser's
knowledge of a judg
st ... his
vendor, should impose upon mm the necessity of paying otherwise than in accordance with his contract. Some courts
>-" ^.e:d. and, it would seem with sound
r
*at the vendor's judgment credij
no lien as against the pur... .
-., though the purchase price is
unpaid and the purchaser knows of the
i-V^^nt
This works no injustice on
-» •-editor, who may proceed by garnishment to reach the purchase money or
by bill for equitable execution to reach
both purchase money and thp wndnr
lien,
Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 579 (footnotes
omitted).
Still another scholar concludes that even
if one considers that the seller's judgment
creditors lien can attach, the creditor
should not have any right to receive payments upon mere attachment of a judgment lien but only upon an execution sale.
Lacy, 24 Case W.Res.LRev. 645, 662,
The dissent also alludes to several policy
considerations which it claims support, its

holding. We discuss each in turn. The
dissent rejects application of the doctrine of
equitable conversion under a uniform real
estate contract claiming that it "is hardly
what most parties to a real estate sale
contract have in mind. The more straightforward notion of such a contract envisions
the land as changing hands only after the
price is paid." However, executory land
sale contracts are used by and are generally intended by the parties as long-term
financing devices similar to mortgages or
trust deeds. Therefore, it is not inconsistent that the effect of a judgment docketed
against the seller under a uniform real
estate contract should be the same as one
docketed against a mortgagee or trust deed
beneficiary. Furthermore, there are absolutely no facts to support the dissent's view
of the parties' intentions in this case. The
dissent candidly admits that the Barkers
did not intend that their judgment creditors
could acquire a supenor position to their
buyer, Ms. Hodge, under the uniform, real
estate contract.
The dissent further admits that ' - cabling creditors to have access to the seller s
title to the property may lessen somewhat
the predictability of real estate transactions." However, it answers this concern
by chiding Professor Langdell and his disciri"" for espousing certainty and predicta».uty m -ega: doctrmes. We believe there
is no better place *>-r Professor Langdell's
'iejjal geometry ' *nd predictability thar n
tne transfer of real property and its **:*' - on mnocent tnird parties who must .-v-ome bngnt iin«- ** *The dissent «•••::»-, ;.<ies the problems created for contra.-* r .\ers by its rale are not
substantial as "a prudent buyer can still
assure his title by checking the judgment
docket to determine if creditors' claims exist "" We believe the dissent places an unreasonable burden on the buyer, one that
for practical purposes wi.il destroy the commercial feasibility of property sales by
long term contracts. Under the dissent's
view, a buyer would be required to check
the judgment docket before .making each
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monthly payment to the seller. We believe
the burden is more equitably placed on the
judgment creditor who can enforce his
judgment under Utah R.Civ.P. 64C. 64D or
69.
Finally, we do not see how the "equities/* as claimed by the dissent, are with
the Clements as judgment creditors in this
case. The issue is not whether the Clements should have recourse on their judgment but rather the procedural form of
their remedy and the person who can be
compelled to satisfy their judgment. It
was the Clements who sat on their rights
failing to pursue their remedies. It is not
inequitable that as a result they cannot
collect their judgment against a subsequent
innocent purchaser.3
In conclusion, we reverse the summary
judgment granted to the Clements and order the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the Cannefaxes quieting
title to the Lockhart Road Property in
them.
JACKSON, Judge (concurring):
The doctrine of equitable conversion runs
counter to some real property law concepts
and my law practice observations of the
expectations of parties to real estate deals.
If I had been involved in the decisions to
take the route leading to adoption of the
doctrine, I would not have favored the trip.
At this point, there is no junction, and the
principle of stare decisis requires that we
continue the journey until our supreme
court chooses to change course. In the
meantime, we need to maintain a stable
direction in the law for the benefit of those
involved in real estate transactions.

in applying the doctrine of equitable conversion to the buyer's interest under a installment land sale contract. I do, however, have insurmountable difficulty in applying it to the seller's interest to the extent that the purchase price is unpaid,
which is the result under the majority opinion. I would, therefore, hold precisely opposite to my esteemed colleagues and affirm the district court.
This case was heard in the district court
on stipulated facts and dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. From the limited scope of those proceedings, the single
issue before the district court and on appeal is whether a contract seller's retained
title is real property to which judgment
creditors' liens can attach pursuant to section 78-22-1 to the extent of the unpaid
price, or whether that title is personalty by
reason of the doctrine of equitable conversion, to which judgment creditors' liens
cannot attach. The majority's conclusion
that the seller's retained title is personalty
appears to me to be contrary to the case
law generally, to run counter to public policy, to presume facts not in evidence, and is
based upon grounds never argued here or
below. I respectfully opine that the majority misinterprets the applicable case law in
Utah and most other jurisdictions and
reaches a result that has nothing to recommend it in terms of public policy, other
than the pursuit of purely theoretical symmetry, that is to say, that if the buyer's
interest might be regarded as personal
property, then it invariably must follow for
reasons of symmetry that the seller's interest is personal property, even though the
seller has not been fully paid and has not
parted with title. I explain first how the
majority's opinion conflicts with the relevant Utah cases, and then turn to considerations of public policy.

J. ROBERT BULLOCK, Senior
District Judge (dissenting):

Utah Case Law on Equitable Conversion

I respectfully dissent. As a general
proposition, I do not have great difficulty

A Utah appellate court has never squarely held, until this case, that a judgment

3. There are no allegations that the Cannefaxes
as buyers acted in bad faith in purchasing the
property at issue. For cases where "sweetheart"
contractual deals are entered into to defraud

creditors, there is a remedy available under the
Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 25-6-1 to -13 (1989).
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against the seller and duly docketed as
section 78-22-1 provides does not create a
lien against the seller's Segal title to land
agreed to be sold under an executory installment contract because the seller's retained title was not. real property.. There
are cases in which the Supreme Court has
relied on the doctrine of equitable conversion in very different contexts; for example, in holding that the seller of property
later condemned was entitled only to the
contract amount' or in holding that the
seller's mterest was taxable as personal
property.2 However, the interests at stake
in estate taxation and eminent domain are
very different from those at stake in debtor-creditor relations, and the majority's references to dicta restating the notion of
equitable conversion in such cases provide
no compelling reason for applying equitable conversion to preclude a judgment
lien. The purely obiter recitations of the
general concept of equitable conversion are
no authority for applying it here. Mere
definition of a concept does not justify its
application; we could as well define a judgment lien and thereupon insist on vindicating the lien in this case,
The most thorough elucidation to date by
the Utah Supreme Court of the scope and
of equitable conversion is found, in
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah
A footnote in Butler at page 1255,
quoted in the majority opinion, defines the
concept of equitable conversion, and it is
upon that definition that the majority prin* cipally relies. However, Butler stops far
l

Jelco. inc. v. Third Judicial District

>uri ?Q

L i a n 2 d 4 7 2 , 5 1 1 P 2d ^39 • I<37* ;

^illson v State J ax Commission .>
- ' 4^9 P.2d 1298 i I9T2*

4,

~iut!er accordingly squares with the law of
- jurisdictions that, have considered the
question. See, e.g.. First Security Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 386 (1967) ('The
majority rule is that a judgment lien against a
vendor after the making of the contract of sale
extends to all of the vendor's mterest remaining
in the land and binds the land to the extent of
the unpaid purchase price.); Heider v. Deitz. 234
Or. 105, 380 P.2d 619 (1963). This majority rule
is further discussed later in this opinion,
740 P.2d at 1255 • 56.

short, of requiring equitable conversion in
every conceivable instance, and, in my
analysis of it, concludes contrary to the
majority opinion in this case/1
Butler
clearly holds that the buyer's interest, is
real property to which a judgment lien attaches subject, to the seller's retained legal
title,4 but it is not all-encompassing in forcing universal adoption and application of
the "parity of reasoning" for which the
majority contends. The main point of the
majority opinion seems to be that, because
the buyer's interest is real property, the
seller's interest must "logically" be personal property. However. Butler's, description of the "parity of reasoning," the logical symmetry that underlies equitable con
version, is not an unqualified, universal
endorsement of it.
Butler's general, introductory restatement of the concept of equitable conversion
is, according to Butler itself,, not a universal verity that must be applied slavishly in
every conceivable instance, without regard
to the merits of such an application. Butler recognizes that equitable conversion re• ults m a characterization of the buyer that
\s :>-: 'A.r-oii\ accurate,."'5 and further
".iite* "hat suitable conversion does not
;-reven* a judgment docketed against the
seller from becoming a lien on the seller's
title to the land *
After stating ;.;at judgment creditors"
ens
against a Oliver's equitable contractu:
j : mterest are not extinguished by an "asMenm*-''.!. »aie or rescission," the Butler
Ju i*. , 2 ^ Butler further notes that
.jui:jbie conversion operates to treat the buyer
»- ov\ner oi" the land only "as a general proposi.on.' I recognize that in many situations, it
lakes good sense to regard the prospective,
conditional performance of the contract as if it
were an accomplished fact: however, this case
does not, present such a situation:..
6. "[A] .udgment ien against the vendor's interest [is not] ?*: nsruisned b\ the vendor's sale of
that .- teres:
* • • : xrv-n " 740 P.2d at
1258.
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opinion continues: "Nor for that matter, is
a judgment lien against the vendor's interest extinguished by the vendor's sale of
that interest to a third person." : The
Clements argue, and I agree, that this
statement clearly shows that the Supreme
Court considers the seller's retained title to
be real property, since judgment liens attach only to real property, not to personal
property, pursuant to section 78-22-1.
The majority views the seller's interest
as. at most, a lien. In this regard, it is true
that Butler analogizes the seller's interest
to a purchase money mortgage, but Butler
is careful to point out it is really no mere
lien; rather, it is legal title to the land,
albeit subject to a conditional promise to
convey at a future date.8 Legal title to
land is not only within the definition and
plain meaning of "real property" in section
78-22-1, but also it is the very archetype of
what real property is.9
Butler clearly recognizes that the seller
retains legal title, and that is where the
analytical usefulness of the analogy to a
lien ends. The seller's retained legal title
is indeed similar to a lien or mortgage, in
that it permits the seller to regain the land
if the buyer defaults. However, the fact
that the retained title may function like a
lien in certain circumstances is far from
saying that it is identical or equivalent to a
lien for all purposes.10 We do not have a
case here in which a seller recovers property from a delinquent buyer, and therefore,
the lien analogy has little utility in this
particular situation. Rather, this is a case
in which a third party seeks to realize a
judgment out of the seller's asset, and the
legal nature of that asset is the object of
7. Butler, 740 P.2d at 1258 (emphasis added).
8. See 740 P.2d at 1256 a. 6.
9. See Restatement of Property § 10 comment c
(1936).
10. Justice Stewart clearly recognized the limitations of the lien analogy in the Butler opinion
when he wrote: 'The term 'vendor's lien' seems
to have stuck even though it is inaccurately used
before the vendor parts with the title. Until
then, it is not, in fact, a lien at ail, but rather a

our inquiry. In this context, it is quite
immaterial that the buyer could lose his
interest in a forfeiture that in some ways
operates as a lien foreclosure. What is
important for present purposes is that the
Barkers held legal title, and. although they
had agreed to part with it at a later date if
Hodge performed her obligations, they still
held legal title when the Clements docketed
their judgment. Consistent with Butler, a
judgment lien would therefore attach to
that title to the extent of the unpaid balance of the contract price.
In respectful contrast to Judge Jackson's
concurring opinion, I am convinced that
stare decisis does not compel the result
reached by the majority. Dicta in Lack v.
Deseret Banku
may have expressed a
view on the subject, but dicta are not holding, and only a holding of the court need be
followed under the principle of stare decisis.12 The precise question that is squarely
presented in this case was an open question
in Utah case law until this case. The prior
adoption in our case law of the general
notion of equitable conversion does not
mean that it must apply in this case; whenever a doctrine of such broad scope is embraced, it must be fine-tuned and exceptions must be carved out to prevent injustice in the many varied applications of the
doctrine. Some of the limitations on equitable conversion were explained in the
Butler case, and in the case before us now,
Butler clearly indicates that equitable conversion should not be applied here.
Deficiencies in Rationale
This is the first time a Utah appellate
court has squarely held that a docketed
retained interest in the land that is derived from
the vendor's retention of the fee title." 740 P.2d
at 1256 n. 6.
11. 746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1988).
12. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 74 Utah 103. 277 P. 206, 210 (1929);
Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533. 216 P. 234,
236-37 (1923).
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judgment does n< -* a> d ^r >,ra nst tr.e
seller's retained title to real propern jni-r
a contract of sale. Since we here lay down
a precedent, I think it is important to examine the rationale and public-policy impacts
of that holding,
The doctrine of nquiuble conversion is
the notion that the seller of a specifically
enforceable contract to convey land is
deemed to own primarily l3 an interest in
personal property, and the buyer's interest
under the contract is characterized as real
property.14 However, while that notion
leads to a sensible result in some situations, it is important not to lose sight of the
fact that such a characterization of the
parties' interests is not generally what they
have in mind. The more straightforward
notion of such a contract envisions the land
as changing hands only after the pnce is
paid; until then, the seller still owns the
land and. the buyer is in the unfulfilled
process of acquiring it.is In order to understand why a legal doctnne such as eq
uitable conversion could be acknowledged
at all when its effect is to transform realty
into personalty, automatically and in disregard of the intention of the parties, a
brief excursus in', J our legal history may
be helpful,
The English common law developed
along 'the lines of certain specific "writs"
issued by the king's courts to' address cer13. The "bare legal title" retained by the seller is
sometimes said to be held in trust for the buyer,
see, e,g., In re Highberger's Estate, 468 Pa. 120,
360 A.2d 580 (1976); In re Krotzsch's Estate, 60
IH.2d 342, 326 N.E.2d 758 (1975); Smith v,
Tang, 100 Ariz. 196, 412 P.2d 697 (1966), or to
be a constructive lien to secure payment of the
price, see Oaks v. Kendall, 23 Cal.App.2d 715, 73
P.2d 1255. 1258-59 (1937). The term "lien,"
however, is actually something of a misnomei ,

as the "Utah Supreme Court explained in Butlet ,
740 P.2d at 1256 n. 6:
The term "vendor's Hen"
is inaccui ately
used before the vendor parts with the title.
Until then, it is not. in fact, a lien at all, but
rather a retained interest in the land that is
derived from the vendor's retention, of the fee
title.
14. See genera H> 3 American La*.
62-64 (Casner ed 'Q*2* R funStoebuck £

*a:i <^\:w Ar.-ngb Pursuant to an early
^ututp, problems that did not fit within the
.,c<»pe *f ar ~v:sting writ could not be
remedied by the king's courts, although the
courts in time became somewhat adept at
stretching the scope of the prescribed writs
by analogy.16. Still, many grievances, such
as a simple breach of a contract, for exampie, were for centuries not effectively resolved by the ngid. stultified rules of the
common law',,17
When relief was not available at common
law for a perceived wrong, the aggrieved
person at first petitioned the king directly
to intervene and do justice. The kings
came to refer such petitions to their chancellors to be decided according to conscience and equity, rather than by the rigid
rules of the common law. The chancellors
eventually developed a system, of courts,
procedure, and substantive law separate'
from the common law, which came to be
known b\ the word "equity."
One of the remedies commonly employed
by the courts of equity was specific performance, an order directing the defendant
to perform a specific act in furtherance of
a ( ontractual obligation. In a contract for
tne -^aie of land, a recalcitrant seller could
- -le-^fi in equity to specifically perform
me j.-rr-ra^t that is, to actually convey the
land. I* "t! failed to do so, he could be
penalize-.: for 'or^empt,18
695-701 (1984); H. McClintock, McCUntock on
Equity 284-38 (1948); 4 J. Pomeroy k S. Symons, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence 472-SO
(1941); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 485-92 (1918).
15. 3A A. Corbm, Corbtn on Contracts 19,3-94
(1960).
16

D. Dobbs, Remedies 28-35 (1978).

17. Id.; L Fuller & M. Eisenberg, Basic Conn act
Law 63^)6 (1972).

18. The earliest origins of equitable conversion
have been traced to trust concepts, independent
of specific performance. Davis, The Origin of
the Doctnne of Equitable Conversion by Contract
25 KyLJ ^8 < 1^36); Simpson, Legislative
Changes w 'he Uaw- ot Equitable Conversion by
•"—J.'

-

•!<-:;

559 n

3 (1935).
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One of the time-honored maxims of equity was that it "regards as done that which
ought to be done." Applying this maxim to
land sale contracts came to mean that if
specific performance could be granted on
the contract, the contract could be considered as if it had been fully performed.
The seller could therefore be treated as
having conveyed the property and received
the price, and the buyer as having received
the property. The seller was therefore
deemed in equity to hold personal property,
and the buyer, real property. This deeming was. of course, a legal fiction; the
contract was fully performed only in the
chancellor's imagination. The reality was
that a deed would be delivered and the
seller would consider himself no longer the
owner when the sale had been consummated by receipt of the full price.19
When the English legal tradition was
transplanted to America, the doctrine of
equitable conversion came along with it.
In 1905, the American legal scholar Christopher Columbus Langdell systematized it
elaborately, and it almost seems as if Langdeli placed his philosophical mark upon the
doctrine, making it into a "legal geometry"
or a "heaven of juristic conceptions.' 20
For Langdell, law was a science, whose
data in the English tradition were the prior
decisions of courts.21 To the legal scientist, cloistered in the library that was his
current formulation of the doctrine, however, is
firmly linked to the specific enforceability of
the contract, perhaps due to the oft-cited formulation by Lord Eldon in a case seeking specific
performance, Seton v. Slade, 7 VesJun. 265
(1802).

laboratory, it was irrelevant whether the
rule extracted from the cases produced a
result that was in reality unjust or at odds
with common sense. What mattered was
not whether the rule was a good one but
rather whether it was the rule.-This rather mechanistic, wholly abstract
view of the law has fallen upon evil days in
recent decades. Sociological jurisprudence
and legal realism waged a war of commentary on the application of fixed rules without regard to fairness in an individual case
or to social policy. In particular, equitable
conversion came to be explained as a
"name given to results reached on other
grounds." zz No longer was it a set of
substantive rules describable in clauses beginning with "if" and "then"; rather, it
was simply a shorthand method of describing what came after the "then." There
was still little thought of adding an express
"because . . . , " or of explaining the reasons
for either the substantive rule or the result
in a specific case.
This inattention to the reasons for equitable conversion led to some roundhouse
critiques of the doctrine. Harlan Stone
debunked it in a 1913 article.-4 Several
other writers also denounced, and uniform
legislation was proposed to counteract, its
effect of placing the risk of casualty loss
on the buyer during the executory period.25
Some cases hedged in relying on the eqthat acceptance is effective on dispatch, regardless of whether it is received, had been criticized
as leading to unjust and absurd results. 'The
true answer" to that criticism was, according to
Langdell, "that it is irrelevant." C.C. Langdell,
A Selection of Coses on the Law of Contracts
995-96 (2d ed. 1879).

19. The fictional character of the rule is apparent
in the fact that equity would not invoke it to
give the purchaser any real incidents of ownership before the time set for performance. H.
McCfintock, McCtintock on Equity 295 (1948).

23. Pound. The Progress of the Law, 33 Harv.L.
Rev. 813, 832 (1920); see also Stone, Equitable
Conversion by Contract, 13 CoIum.L.Rev. 369
(1913).

20. 3 American Law of Property 64 (Casner, ed.,
1952).

24. Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13
Coium.L.Rev. 369 (1913).

21. Address by C.C. Langdell delivered November 5, 1886, reprinted in Law Quarterly Review
123, 124 (1887).

25. E.g., Vannemann, Risk of Loss in Equity between the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate
and Transfer of Title, 8 Minn.L.Rev. (1924);
Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executory
Contract of Sale in the Common Law, 9 Harv.L.
Rev. 106 (1895).

22. For example, Langdell noted in his casebook
on contracts that the "mailbox rule" holding
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uitable conversion doctrine, declaring that
it would be invoked only when it led to a
fair result.-' Contrary to the majority's
claim, my thorough reading of the modern
commentary on equitable conversion generally reveals little enthusiasm for universal
application of the doctrine and no persuasive reasoning to support its application
in this case.
The scholarly criticism of the blind application of the doctrine of equitable conversion has, however, been only partially successful in preventing its misuse in the
courts. Leading commentators have recently noted that "decisions [on equitable
conversion] often seem adamant in their
unwillingness to discuss the underlying policy issues; equitable conversion almost becomes a substitute for thinking about the
real questions in the case." r' There is no
justification for ignoring what is actually
happening in a case and what the parties'
clash of interests is really all about. Invoking a talisman such as "equitable conversion" to give a name and ostensible
legitimacy to a rule without a rationale is a
jurisprudential cop-out, and exposes society
to potential danger from rules that have
drifted from their public policy moorings.
In my opinion, courts have a responsibility
to continually scrutinize the law we apply,
26. E.g., Clay v. Undreth, 187 Va. 169, 45 S.E.2d
875 (1948); In re Seiferts Estate, 109 N.H. 62.
242 A.2d 64, 33 A.L.R.3d 1276 (1967); National
Bank of Topeka v. Saia, 154 Kan. 740, 121 P.2d
251 (1942).
27. R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman,
The Law of Property 699 (1984).
28. See Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740
P.2d 1281. 1285-86 (Utah 1987); B. Cardozo,
The Nature of the Judicial Process 98-142 (1921).
Holmes expressed both the compunctions and
the necessity felt by a person who must discharge this responsibility in saying that he "hesitate(s] to affirm universal validity for his social
ideals" and "may be ready to admit that he
knows nothing about an absolute best in the
cosmos, and even that he knows next to nothing
about a permanent best for men. Still it is true
that a body of law is more rational and more
civilized when every rule it contains is referred
articulately and definitely to an end which it
subserves, and when the grounds for desiring
that end are stated or are ready to be stated in
words." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv.
L.Rev. 457, 468-69 (1897).

particularly judicially-created law such as
equitable conversion, in order to weed out
defects in the law as it has been handed
down to us and to keep it consistent with
evolving social policy and conditions.28
Viewing the policies and practical reasons for equitable conversion, I firmly believe that it is not a rule that should be
applied as a matter of course in every
instance. Rather, it describes a result in
which the seller's interest is deemed to be
essentially personalty and the buyer's interest to be realty. In reaching that result,
the court should endeavor, as with any
contract, to give effect to the reasonable
expectations of the parties.29 While applying equitable conversion automatically for
every question involving a land sale contract may foster easy predictability, it
would nevertheless in many instances disregard or frustrate what the parties intended their contract to accomplish, which is a
transfer of property when it is paid for, but
not before. The contract in this case, for
example, clearly contemplates a transfer of
ownership by deed after all installments
have been paid.
One involuntary consequence 30 of the
seller's retention of title to the property is
that his creditors may reach it in satisfac29. 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 1-3 (1963);
see also John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City
Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987); Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of Am., 17 Utah 2d 114,
405 P.2d 339 (1965); Carlson v. Hamilton, 8
Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958).
50. We recognize that the buyer and seller in this
case, like most, probably did not intend for a
judgment lien to attach to the sellers interest
shortly before the seller conveyed to the buyer,
and they would have precluded the lien, if that
were possible. However, the law also recognizes the rights of a party's creditors to reach
assets in satisfaction of their judgments, without
regard to the debtor's preferences in the matter.
Therefore, once it is clear that they have, by
their intent, retained a property interest, the
rights of creditors to reach that interest operate
without regard to what the debtor-promisor and
his promisee may have intended.

CANNEFAX v. CLEMENT
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tion of their claims against him. Enabling
creditors to have access to the seller's title
to the property is thought by the majority
to lessen the predictability of real estate
transactions. However, a prudent buyer
can still assure his title by checking the
judgment docket to determine if creditors'
claims exist. In this and most sales, the
buyer has recourse against the seller if
title is encumbered, and. if the encumbrance is serious, may rescind the sale.31
If. however, the buyer ignores the encumbrance, he proceeds at his peril, unless he
can prove himself to be a bona fide purchaser or invoke statutory protection such
as the recording act.32 Neither Hodge nor
the Cannefaxes attempted to rescind, or
asserted that they are bona fide purchasers
or protected under the recording act. In
these circumstances, there is nothing
wrong with leaving the loss to fall upon the
buyer, who is able to discover in advance
the faults in the title and take corrective
action.
In determining the legal effect of a contract, therefore, the intent of the parties 33
should carry far more weight than a legal
fiction, however deep in tradition the fiction's roots. People have a right to make
contracts and to have their lawful contractual intentions fulfilled, and they cannot
fairly be expected to make contracts with a
thorough knowledge of the oblique way in
which nine centuries of equitable jurisprudence may twist and "convert" the meaning of their intentions.34 In holding that
the buyer's and seller's interests are equitably converted, the majority is oblivious to
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the face of the contract itself, which provides that the seller will convey the real
property when the price is received, and
not before. It was undisputed that the
price was not received when the Clements'
judgment was docketed.
In my view, the majority also places insufficient value in the need to efficiently
enforce judgments. They intimate that the
Clements could have executed on their
judgment, but ignore the fact that their
execution was judicially restrained in this
case. It is also unclear in Utah law that
the Clements have anything on which they
could execute, without a judgment lien. At
common law, execution cannot be levied on
a chose in action.35 and, although that common law rule has been changed by statute
in many jurisdictions, there is no applicable
Utah statute. Thus, by reducing the seller's interest to a mere contract receivable,
the majority leaves the judgment creditor
without a clear, sure means of reaching the
seller's contract interest under our law,
other than by garnishing each payment as
it accrues. Enforcing a duly entered judgment thus becomes a cumbersome process
of having a writ issued and served before
each installment is paid.
Most jurisdictions that have considered
this question have weighed the policy considerations as I do. Contrary to the assertion of the majority, the scholars studying
this question all conclude that the majority
of jurisdictions hold that a judgment lien
attaches to the seller's interest in a contract for the sale of real property.36
More persuasive, however, than the results of any interstate judicial poll are the

31. Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah
1984); CallLster v. Milbtream Assocs., Inc., 738
P.2d 662 (Utah App.1987).

this same criticism. Rather, they serve to carry
into effect the fair and reasonable intentions of
the parties.

32. See Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396, 398-99
(Utah 1983).

35. 33 CJ.S. Executions § 28 at 158-59 (1942).

33. Contrary to the majority's view, the intent of
the parties is clear from the face of their contract, and, under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence is unnecessary and inadmissible.
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.
Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
34. Other equitable doctrines, such as estoppel,
laches, unclean hands, etc. are not subject to

36. E.g., Monroe v. Lincoln City Employees Credit
Union, 203 Neb. 702, 279 N.W.2d 866 (1979);
First Security Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429
P.2d 386 (1967); Heider v. Deitz. 234 Or. 105,
380 P.2d 619 (1963). Surveys of case law on
point include R. Cunningham. W. Stoebuck & D.
Whitman, The Law of Property 701 (1984);
Lacy, Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24
Case W.Res.L.Rev. 645, 646 (1973); 3 Am. Law
of Property 11.29 at 85 (1952).
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compelling needs to recognize the parties' to those potential defenses They precontractual intent and to provide an effec- sume, for example that the Cannefaxes
tive means of enforcing judgments Con- are bona fide purchasers and the\ also
versely there is no real reason favoring view the Clements as having failed to perequitable conversion in this setting other form a duty to give actual notice to the
than perhaps a wish for abstract svmmetry Cannefaxes in order to perfect in a
or elegantia juris, which could incline one sense their lien against the Cannefaxes
to the notion that, since the buyer has real However the Cannefaxes bona fides and
property under equitable conversion princi- lack of actual notice are unproven facts
that might have been material to defensive
ples, the seller must conversely have perarguments that were never raised Since
sonal property for all purposes, including the Cannefaxes had the burden of avoiding
37
the attachment of judgment hens
How- the hen in order to quiet title 38 judgment
ever, to give way to such a wish in dis- against them is correct even though there
regard of the parties' intent and of the was no apparent inquiry into either actual
need to enforce lawful judgments is sheer notice, the Cannefaxes' knowledge of the
formalism, a glorification of abstraction for judgment or lack of it, or into their bona
abstraction's sake
fides in any respect
Potential Defenses Not Raised
The Cannefaxes' position here and m the
district court has consisted only of an at
tempt to invoke equitable conversion to
prevent the Clements' judgment hen from
attaching The Cannefaxes have not asserted any defences against the enforcement of the Clements' lien, once it attached. Ordinarily, there would be little
need to mention defenses never raised by
the parties, but m this case, I believe the
majority has, m effect, given some weight
37. It is perhaps ironic that equitv, which began
as an effort to overcome the constricting for
malism of the common law writ system, came
to have such a penchant for wholly abstract
logical symmetry Some of this devotion to
abstract symmetry has already been discarded,
the old equitable doctrine of mutuality of reme
dy for example, which held that an equitable
remedy could be granted to the plaintiff only if
the defendant, under like, hypothetical circum
stances, could obtain the same remedy has
been totally discarded Utah Mercur Gold Mm
ing Co v Herschel Gold Mining Co, 103 Utah
249, 134 P 2d 1094, 1097 (1943) ('The remedy of
one should not depend upon the hypothetical
case of what another could demand if the situa
uon were different"), Genola Town v Santagum City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P2d 930, 934 (1938)

As the majority also points out. several
jurisdictions have held that the judgment
lienor cannot recover from the buyer any
installment payments made m the ordinary
course of contract performance without actual notice of the existence of the judgment
hen w These holdings are rooted in concern that the buyer not be required to
check the judgment docket every time an
installment payment is made, such would
be an "intolerable inconvenience " 40 Instead, the buyer is permitted to continue
paying installments, which are credited
against the pnee, until the buyer is given
Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24 Case
W Res L Rev at 646-47, A Freeman & E
Turtle, A Treatise on the Law of Judgments 965
(5th ed 1905)

40. Mover v Hinman, 13 N Y 180(1855) Such
concern certainly has its place in adjudication,
and Utah case law has recognized that simple
fairness and the equities' mav properly be con
sidered in reaching a decision Jacobson v Jacobson, 557 P 2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976), but see
Bnggs v Uddell, 699 P2d 770 772 (Utah 1985)
("equitable powers are narrowly bounded")
However an unstructured, unguided inquiry
into 'whatevers fair' invites subjectivity <md
inconsistent, uncertain results, and the often
elusive and ethereal nature of "fairness* would
leave little effective means, other than litigation,
for resolving disputes I would therefore prefer
to see such equitable concern take a more struc
38. Olsen v Park Daughters Inv Co., 29 Utah 2d
tured form, such as laches. Under that doc
421, 511 P2d 145 (1973)
trine, a lienor would be barred from enforcing
the lien if the lienor delayed in asserting his
39. May v Emerson, 52 Or 262, 96 P 454 (1908).
rights while his adversary performed reason
Wehn v Fall, 55 Neb 547, 76 N W 13 (1898),
ably and innocently to his detriment See Borsee R Cunningham, W Stoebuck & D Whit
land v Chandler, 733 P 2d 144 (Utah 1987)
man, The Law of Property 702 (1982), Lacy.
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actual, not merely constructive, notice of
the lien. I have no guarrel with such a
conclusion, but there is absolutely no occasion to reach it in this case, since there is
no indication in the stipulated facts whether or not the Cannefaxes had actual notice
of the lien at a time when they could have
averted consummation of the sale. The
Cannefaxes, in seel ing to quiet title
against the Clements, had the burden of
going forward with evidence showing that
the lien was unenforceable.41 All section
78-22-1 requires for a lien to attach is
entry of the judgment and docketing in the
proper county. The judgment creditor is
not required to do anything more, such as
give actual notice to a contract buyer, and
to require more would run contrary to section 78-22-1.42

chase price and the performance of other
terms of the contract.
I recognize that the recording statutes
and bona fide purchaser considerations are
significant and may be overriding in a given case.13 However, no such matters appear from the stipulated facts in this case
and none were raised or argued in the
district court or here on appeal.
From the cases, as well as an examination of the historical underpinnings of the
equitable conversion fiction, which is not a
doctrine of universal application, I am regrettably compelled to respectfully disagree with the majority's opinion, and I
would affirm the trial court.

?

KEY HUMBtR SYSTt

Conclusion
In conclusion. I believe there is no question but that the buyer's interest in an
executory land sale contract may be characterized as real property under the fiction
of equitable conversion for the purpose of
the attachment of the buyer's judgment
creditors' liens. However, the cases, including Butler, do not hold that because
the buyer s interest may be considered real
property for that purpose, it must then
necessarily follow that the seller's retained
title is personalty to which the liens of the
seller's judgment creditors cannot attach.
In my opinion, the rule to be deduced
from Butler and the cases cited therein is
that the seller's retained title in an installment land sale contract was, is, and remains real property to the extent of the
unpaid balance of the purchase price for
the purposes of the attachment of liens of
the seller's judgment creditors. Further,
by reason of the fiction of equitable conversion, the buyer's interest may also be characterized as real property, limited only by
the right of the setter to receive the pur-

Jane DOE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Shirlene HAFEN, as personal representative ad litem of the Estate of Melvin
Reeves, Defendant and Respondent
Jane DOE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Shirlene HAFEN, as personal representative ad litem of the Estate of Melvin
Reeves, Defendant and Respondent.
Nos. 870310-CA, 870514-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 16, 1990.
Prior report: 772 P.2d 456.
Rehearing denied.
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41. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 511 P.2d atit learned of the lien, or whether the Clements'
146. There are several other potential argulien is inferior in priority to the interests of
ments which, in an appropriate factual setting,
Hodge and the Cannefaxes.
the buyer could have asserted against the lien.
However, we have neither facts nor argument to 42. Tavlor Natl Inc. v. Jensen Bros. Constr. Co.,
enable us to determine, for example, whether
641 P.2d 150, 154-55 (Utah 1982).
the title company handling the closing was negligent and could have reversed the transaction
by returning escrowed deeds and money when 43. Butler, 740 P.2d 1259-40.

UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate thit
2fl!i3
day of
August
_ _ A. D., 19—fllf,
by and between
GEORGE W. BAP.KFR. JR. and LT1A M BARKER, h i < un f A
hereinafter deeignated at the Seller, and
her.in.fur designated a. the Buyer, of

DIANE HQDG£
Salt

Lake COUHty, S t a t e

of

Utah

2 WITNESSETH That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to tell and convey u» the buye
and the buyer for the euiieideration herein mentioned agreet to purchase the folio*m^ described real property, situate ih
the county of

S a l t Lake

Sute of Utah, to-wit

2563 Ea§t L Q C ^ r t ROfl<3
Aooacaa

More particularly deeenbed at followt:

SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND MADE A PART OF THIS CONTRACT

3. Said Buyer hereby agreet to enter into pottettion and pay for taid described premises the turn of .

r,NP miNhprn srrrv THmsAr-.r, ANH an/mo

0olUr.

payable at the office of Seller, his attignt or order
strictly within the following timet, tcwit: FORTY THOUSAND ANn Nf)/1Q0

tt 160.000.QQ [•
it40.000.00

cash, the receipt of which it hereby acknowledged, and the balance of fl?fl t nnn

00

«Ka>ll be paid at followi

SEE EXHIBIT M B M ATTACHED HERETO AND MADE A PART OF THIS CONTRACT

Possession of said premises thai) be delivered to buyer on the

2nd

day of

September

§

ia 81

4. Said monthly payments arc to be applied firtt to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of tM
principal

Interest shall be charged from .,

Sfiptgfllftfir

Z% 19fil

on all unpaid portions of the

purchase price at the rata of
Ft FVFN
par cent ( _ L L _ " r ) per annum The Buyer, at his option at anytime
may pay amount* in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limkutione of any murine***
or contract by the Buyer herein ansumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of fututeinstallments at the election of the buyer, which election mutt be made at the time the eicets payment it made
I
fi« It is understood and agreed that if the Sailer accepts payment from the Buyer on thts contract less than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract at to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or aa to any other remedies of the teller.
j
I. It it understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of
rrnrpfli

SAVTNHS A I HAM a ^ n r T A T M M *nH THE MNTTNENTAI

i 12s8QQ,QQ*and J46.QQQ.QPf» of

August. 1 . 19fll

PRUDENTIAL

'

RANK ANn T P I L « . Q Q M P A ^ ^ ^ j (

(**w™^mAt*

h>y>nr*<)

,

7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to »*idf»%)£)1
iscs now tn the process of b«ing installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said propV *"
erty, except the following
NQNF
\
— _ _ ^ — « _ ^ » « _
K. The Seller ts given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed tie
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed
ELr^Y^N,
. p«rce<at
( 11 .-'< ) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments, provided that the agrregata monthly Inatatlmelt
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not b« greater than each installment payment required is
made b> the Buyer under this vuntrect Vr nen the principal due hereunder ftas been reduced to the amount of any sue.,
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property
subject to said loans and mortgages
V. If the Buyer detiret to exercise hit right through accelerated payments under thit agreement to pay off any ob .
gauone outstanding at date of thit agreement againtt taid property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume aid
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligation*. Prepayment penalties in respett
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by taller unlets
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer
|
20. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of iu)h
amount as can be secured under the regulations of taid lender and hereby agreet to apply any amount so received up<j
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half thew expenses •pessary in obtaining said lo«n, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that *
payments aid
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest r*** T
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kir
iy be assess lad
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this ag
ts and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the followini

£ijQii£

rv? fintT

The Seller further covenants and agrees thot he will not da fault lo the pa.,

___________

Id pro p a r i

12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after .

January 1, 1981

13. The Buyer further afreet to keep all Insurable buildings and improvements on said premises Insured in a eoml
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not Icaa than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $
_ _ _ 1
and to assign said insurance to the Seller aa hit interest* may appear and U deliver the insurance policy to him.
14. In the event the Buytr shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessment or insurance
premium* at herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessrnenu and insurance premiums or either
of them, and if Seller elect* to to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per
month until paid.
|
16. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon
said premises, and that he wilt maintain said premises in good condition.
14. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to makl
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within
"^U"*_
days thereafter, tha
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies.
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written no tic
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which havfc
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages tJr
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agreea that the Seller may at his option re-enter and lakk
possession of said premises without legal processes as in ita first and former estate, together with all impruv
ments and additiona made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller, i
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including eosta and attorneys
(••». (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resomn|c
to one of the other remeoies hereunder in the event of a subaequent default): or
C. The Seller shall have the right, at hia option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaii
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contiact as a note and mortgage, and pais
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws df
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owinf
including eosts and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remai
In the ca»e of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled i
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rente, issues ai^i
profits therefrom ami apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuat
to order of the court, and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the posset*it
of the said premises during the period of redemption.
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement.
Id. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances againat aaid premises other than those herein provided for
T9t9rrt4 to, or in the event any hens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against tri
same by ecu or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at hia option, pay and discharge the same and receive cred
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pai
menu herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time aa such suspended
•payments shall equal any sums advanced aa aforeaaid.
19. The Sejler on receiving the payments herein reserved to bo paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the Utle to ttfe
above described premises fr*t and clear of al) encumbrances except aa herein mentioned and except aa may have accrue*!
by or through the acta or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at hie expense, a policy of title insurance in the emoui
of the purchaae pnee or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during tM
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer.
20. It it hereby expreasly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property
In ita present condition and that there are no representation*, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto wi0
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto

Seller warrants that a

heating, plumbing, electrical to be in good condition at time of possession.

21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenant* or agreement* contained herein, that the defaulting party shall pay all cost* and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit
or otherwise.
22. It ta understood that the stipulations aforeaaid are to apply to and bind the heir*, executors, administrator*. su^<
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their name*, the day and yit
first above written.
S l u e d in the presence of / /
''
'
/
\

4~

c

George W. Barker, Jr.
U U M. Barker
D i W Hodge

Seller

*4±
Buyer
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Exhibit MAM attached hereto and made a part of that Unifonn Real Estate
Contract by and between George W. Barker, Jr. and Li la M. Barker, his
wife, as Seller and Diane Hodge, as Buyer, dated August 28, 1981.
$5,000.00 or more due and payable on or before September 2, 1982.
$1,363.92 or more per month beginning with the first payment October 2,
1981 and $1,363.92 on the 2nd day of each and every month thereafter;
until on or before September 2, 1982 when the above mentioned balloon
payment is due. Said monthly paynient applies to principal and interest
only.
At the time the above mentioned balloon payment is made, monthly payments
on this Contract will be adjusted based on the then remaining balance
amortzed over a fourteen (14) year period.
In addition to said monthly payment, Buyer is to pay separately the
annual real estate taxes and fire insurance premium promptly when same
becomes due.
It is mutually agreed that the Buyer may at her option make balloon
payments in ^ny amount at ^ny time. Should Buyer elect to make balloon
payments, the monthly payments on this Contract will be reduced and
amortized over the remaining yean of this Contract.
This Contract shall be amortized for fifteen (15) years.

George'w". Barker, Jr t , Seller
"")' T . t

V

/"',-

t /c

<. :

Lila M. Barker, Seller

Of*he Hodge, ^uyer
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Exhibit "Q" attached hereto and made a part of that Uniform Real Estate Contraqt
by and between George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila M. Barker, his wife, as Seller arj
Diane Hodge, as Buyer, dated August 28, 1981.

BEGINNING at a point on an old fence line south 'l'U.Z6 feet and West
796.69 feet from tne re-established Northeast Corner of Section 1U,
Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point
also being North 74°33* 15" East 207 feet and North 17°2r West 490.28
feet and North 71°56' East 313.33 feet from a County Monument; ^nd
running thence North 21°27' West 237.68 feet to the center of Spring
Creek; thence North 68° East 90 feet along said Creek to a point on the
boundary line described in that certain Quit-Claim Deed recorded in Book
22U3, Page 488; thence South 25°30' East 245.5 feet along said boundary
line; thence South 71°56' West 107.5 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
SUBJECT TU ANO TOGETHER WITH a right of way described as follows: BEGINNING
at a point South 787.42 feet and West 948.37 feet from the re-established
Northeast corner of Section 10, Township 2 South,, Range 1 East, Salt
Lake Meridian, said point also being North 74°33 15" East 207 feet from
a County Monument, and running thence North l 17°21' West 490.28 feet
along an old fence line; thence North 71°56 East 313.31 feet along an
old fence line to a point of 35 foot radius curve to the left; thence
Northerly 146.61 feet around said curve to point of 3b foot radius curve
to the right; thence Westerly 36.65 feet around said curve; thence South
71°56' West 173.01 feet to a point of a fifty foot radius curve to the
right; thence Westerly 27.74 feet around said curve to a point of 50
foot radius reverse curve to the left; thence Westerly 105.66 feet
around said curve to dn old fence line; thence South 17°21' East 489.23
feet alony said fence to the center of a County Road; thence North
74°33'15 M East 23 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
Situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Together with pool table and one share Spring Creek Irrigation Water.
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AMENDMENT TO UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, OATED AUGUST 28, 1981, 8Y ANO BETWEEN
GEORGE W. BARKER, OR. ANO LILA M. DARKER, HIS WIFE, AS SELLER, ANO OIANE HODGE,
AS BUYER.
Effective November 30, 1981 the followinq chanqes are m full force and effect:
Interest Rate: Ten and one-half per cent per annum
Contract 8alance:

(10.5%)

$99,470.00

Terms of Repayment:
$1,104.65 or more per month beginninq with the first payment December 2, 1981
and $1,104.65 or more on the 2nd day of each and every month thereafter until
the entire principal balance toaether with accrued interest is paid in full.
Said monthly payments apply to principal and interest only. In addition to
said monthly payments the buyer is to pay seperately the annual real estate
taxes and fire insurance premium promptly when same becomes due.
It is mutually agreed that the Buyer may at her option make balloon payments,
in any amount, at any time. Should Buyer elect to make balloon payments, the
monthly payments on this contract will be reduced and amortized over the
remaining years of this contract.
Thi£_contract shall be amortized for^fjfteen (V&'years.
~ P V

Witness

7

^

^Reorflfe W. Barker, Jr., Seller
Liljf M. Barker, Seller

/

mVflr^B nyltts
DUne Hodae, Buyer

'
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